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I. THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPrCY LAWS
The dramatic increase of petitions filed under the Bankruptcy Act by
consumer debtors between 1946 and 1967 was perhaps the most significant
* Thomas M. Cooley Professor of Law, University of Michigan
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factor that led to the establishment of the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States in 1970.1 The Commission was charged with the
responsibility of studying, analyzing, evaluating, and recommending
changes in the bankruptcy laws.2 The Commission found no reason to
believe from its study, however, that the number of bankruptcy petitions
being filed was excessive or that there was need for legislation to restrict
access to the bankruptcy court by debtors seeking relief.3 The general
thrust of the Commission's recommendations was to facilitate the filing of
petitions under the bankruptcy laws by removing certain obstacles to effec-
tive relief. For this very reason, however, the recommendations were criti-
cized by spokesmen for the consumer credit industry.4
Despite the increase in bankruptcies, the Commission was concerned
that many consumer debtors filed without adequate information or under-
standing as to the nature of the relief available under the bankruptcy laws. 5
One result of the lack of information regarding the possibilities under the
Bankruptcy Act was the sporadic use of Chapter XIII by eligible wage-
earner debtors.' The Commission recommended that relief available under
Chapter XI be made more attractive in a number of ways,7 that its
benefits be made available to any individual debtor with sufficiently regu-
lar and stable income to be able to make fixed payments of indebtedness
pursuant to a plan,8 and that every individual eligible for such relief be
counseled as to the options available under the bankruptcy laws before
being required to select a form of relief.
The Commission did not focus solely on the individual debtor. With
I REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE'UNITED STATES, Part I, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Part I, 93d. Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9, 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
REPORT I]. The preamble to the Act of July 24, 1970 (amended 1973), Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84
Stat. 468, which created the Commission, referred first to the increase in the number of
bankruptcies by more than 1000 percent in the preceding twenty years.
2 Act of July 24, 1970 (amended 1973), Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468.
' COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 9.
See Twinem, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAW.
353, 354 (1974); Wiese, The Position of the National Consumer Finance Association on the
Report of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws and the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973,
28 PERs. FIN. L.Q. REP. 47, 48 (1974).
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 9, 11, 159-60.
Id. at 9, 12, 157-58.
Id. at 13-14. The Commission suggested making relief by way of composition as well
as extension available notwithstanding a debtor's having obtained a discharge or confirma-
tion of a composition within the previous five-year period; eliminating confirmation of a
composition as a limitation on future relief under the bankruptcy laws; eliminating the
necessity of obtaining unsecured creditors' consent to a plan; enabling a debtor to obtain relief
respecting indebtedness secured by real property; and enabling a debtor to obtain relief
respecting indebtedness secured by personal property notwithstanding the secured creditor's
objection.
' See id. at 11.
'Id. at 11, 159-60; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137 Part II, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. § 4-203, 73-74 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as COMMISSION REPORT Il].
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respect to business bankruptcies, the Commission's principal concerns re-
lated to the inadequacy of relief afforded creditors. The meagerness of
distributions to creditors has been a frequent focus of critics of bankruptcy
administration in this country. 0 The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States found that factors delaying the commencement of pro-
ceedings under the Bankruptcy Act when liquidation was inevitable
tended to reduce the estate available for distribution." In order to make
the bankruptcy laws "more effective as an instrumentality for relief at the
instance of creditors," the Commission recommended eight changes in the
laws:
(1) The concept of 'an act of bankruptcy' be abolished and the
debtor be made amenable to involuntary proceedings when he has
ceased to pay his debts or will be generally unable to pay his
current liabilities.
(2) A debtor be protected against the risks of ill-founded peti-
tions by requiring the court to hold a hearing immediately after the
filing of an involuntary petition to determine whether the relief
sought is in the best interests of the debtor and its creditors.
(3) A general assignment or generalt receivership continue to
be a basis for involuntary proceedings without regard to whether
the debtor was insolvent or unable to pay his debts at the time of
the filing of the petition, on the premise that such a disposition or
proceeding contemplates a liquidation and that creditors be able
to require it to be conducted subject to the safeguards provided by
the Bankruptcy Act.
(4) There be no jury trial of any issue raised on an involuntary
petition.
(5) A creditor or creditors who have aggregate claims of $2,500
be able to file an involuntary petition for liquidation of the debtor,
and one or more creditors having claims of $10,000 or more be able
to file a petition seeking reorganization of the debtor.
(6) The estate be protected against the risk of depletion and
deterioration of assets pending a determination of the issues on an
involuntary petition by allowing the Bankruptcy Administration
with court approval to take immediate possession to preserve the
property during the interim before determination of the issues on
the petition., '
(7) During the interim between the filing of the petition and
the determination of the issues thereon, persons dealing with the
debtor in the ordinary course of his business be protected by being
'1 See, e.g., S. ENZER, R. DE BRIGARD, & F. LANGAR, SOME CONSMERATIONS CONCERNING
BANKRUPTCY REFORM 218 (1973); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 92-93, 130 (1971); Lacy, Land Sale Contracts in Bankruptcy, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
477, 502 (1973).
" COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 14.
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allowed to retain money or property acquired and to have claims
against the estate for credit extended, and the Bankruptcy Admin-
istration be authorized to give express approval to specific transac-
tions pending the resolution of the issues on the petition.
(8) The exclusion of corporations other than those that are
moneyed, business, or commercial from amenability to involun-
tary proceedings be eliminated, along with the meaningless 'wage
earner' exclusion.'
2
The problem of delay confronted not only creditors anxious to com-
mence an involuntary proceeding to liquidate a debtor's estate. A debtor
contemplating reorganization under Chapter XI frequently postponed the
filing of the petition until losses and deterioration of his financial condition
frustrated efforts to accomplish any realistic rehabilitation.' An involun-
tary petition for a composition, extension, or reorganization was not avail-
able under the Bankruptcy Act except under Chapters VIII and X.11 These
chapters, however, authorized petitions to be filed only by or against corpo-
rations,'5 and the chapters were designed primarily for large, publicly-held
corporations needing pervasive adjustments of their debt and capital
structure. The use of Chapter X, which applied to corporations other than
railroad corporations, was more restricted than the architects of the chap-
ter intended.'7 Consequently, most reorganizations of debtors under the
Bankruptcy Act were effected in cases commenced and controlled by the
debtors themselves."5 Chapter XII authorized a creditor or creditors under
certain circumstances 9 to propose a plan for reorganization. This option,
however, was not exercised often because of the restrictions on its applica-
bility and the benefits available under the chapter. The Commission rec-
ommended the consolidation of the reorganization chapters into a single
chapter to eliminate the necessity of choosing the correct mode of relief and
,2 Id. at 15.
,3 See Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomittee on Civ. & Const'l Rts. of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1867 (1976)(statement of Harvey
L. Miller, William J. Rochelle, and J. Ronald Trost for the National Bankruptcy Conference)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
14 An involuntary petition could be filed under § 77(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
R. BANKR. P. 8-103, and under § 126 of the Bankruptcy Act, and R. BANKR. P. 10-105 but not
under any of the sections and rules applicable to Chapter IX, Chapter XI, and Chapter XII
cases.
'5 Bankruptcy Act §§ 88(a), 107, 126.
" See COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 23.
'7 Id. at 246-48. The Commission Report described the increasing resort to Chapter XI
rather than Chapter X for reorganization of large, publicy-held debtors. See also H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963,
6182 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. But see Hearings, supra note 13, at 2171-75 &
2208, containing rebuttal testimony by the Securities & Exchange Commission on the use of
Chapters X and XI.
" House REPORT, supra note 17, at 244-54, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6201-
13.
" Bankruptcy Act § 466, and R. BANKR. P. 12-36(b)(1976).
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to eliminate the resulting litigation of the question whether the -correct
choice was made."0 The result enlarged the kinds of relief obtainable in a
reorganization case, and the Commission recommended that creditors
should be enabled to commence an involuntary reorganization case as well
as a case for liquidation."'
Finally, the Commission recognized that special problems arise in
connection with estates that have assets in the United States and other
countries. Therefore the Commission recommended a continuation of the
option available to the debtor or a creditor to seek dismissal or suspension
of a case commenced under the Bankruptcy Act when a liquidation or
rehabilitation proceeding is pending in another country.2 The Commission
proposed that the representative of a debtor undergoing liquidation or
rehabilitation in a foreign country also should be afforded the option of
filing a bankruptcy petition in this country against the debtor or a com-
plaint seeking the dismissal or suspension of a petition previously filed by
or against the debtor. The Commission also recommended that representa-
tives be able to seek an injunction to stay any action against the debtor or
enforcement of any lien against the debtor's property, or a complaint seek-
ing turnover of property of the debtor.Y These proposals looked to the
enhanced possibilities of coordinated administration of estates involving
other countries as well as the United States.
24
The reforms enacted by Congress on November 6, 1978, as the new
Bankruptcy Code,2 embody most of the recommendations of the Commis-
sion on Bankruptcy Laws set out in the preceding paragraphs. This article
is an examination of the provisions of the Code that bear on the commence-
ment of a case.
I1. THE FouR KINDS OF CASES UNDER THE BANKRuPTcY CODE
The commencement of a case under the new Bankruptcy Code is gov-
erned by sections 301-04 in Subchapter I of Chapter 3.2 Four different
kinds of cases are recognized in the new law, and a separate section of Title
11 deals with each. Section 301 covers voluntary cases, section 302 deals
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 23, 28, 245-48.
2! Id. at 28; COMMISSION REPORT I1, supra note 9, § 4-205(b), at 74.
22 COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, § 4-103(a), at 69.
- Id. § 4-103(b)(2), at 69.
24 The proposals for coordination between foreign and domestic bankruptcies were the
target of extended criticism but were enacted substantially as proposed. See notes 158, 217,
221-23, & 225 infra.
11 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). The new
Bankruptcy Code is sometimes referred to as the Bankruptcy Reform Act or the Edwards Act.
It will not be referred to as the Bankruptcy Act in this article, since that is the proper title of
the bankruptcy law originally enacted in 1898. See Act of Dec. 20, 1959, Pub. L. No. 81-879,
64 Stat. 1113. The Bankruptcy Code will frequently be referred to in the text and notes simply
as the 'Code'.
2 Chapter 3 is entitled "Case Administration," 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-66 (1979) and Sub-
chapter I is entitled "Commencement of a Case." 11 U.S.C.A. § 301-06 (1979).
1979]
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with joint cases, section 303 governs involuntary cases, and section 304 is
concerned with cases ancillary to foreign proceedings.
These four sections govern the commencement of all cases whether the
petitioner is seeking liquidation, a composition, extension, reorganization,
or any other variety of relief avaliable under the Code. These sections
should eliminate or minimize differences that have heretofore character-
ized the rules and forms applicable under different chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
A. Voluntary Cases - Section 301
1. The Petition
Section 301 authorizes a voluntary case to be commenced by a debtor
filing a petition 7 under Chapter 7, Chapter 9, Chapter 11, or Chapter 13.1
Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of a debtor's estate; Chapter 9 for ad-
justment of the debts of a municipality; Chapter 11 for reorganization of
a debtor; and Chapter 13 for adjustment of the estate by an extension or
composition of the debts of an individual with regular income. A voluntary
case is commenced by the filing of a petition with the bankruptcy court.29
As under most of the sections of the Bankruptcy Act authorizing a volun-
tary petition, a voluntary petition under the Code cannot be contested.30
2 "[Pletition" is defined in § 101(31) of the Code as a "petition filed under Section 301,
302, 303, or 304 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title." 11
U.S.C.A. § 101(31) (1979). [In this article all citations to sections and references to this title
are references to Title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated:] "Petition"
was defined in § 1(24) of the Bankruptcy Act as "a document filed in a court of bankruptcy
or with a clerk thereof initiating a proceeding under this title." This definition is also an
appropriate one for the Bankruptcy Code, except that the petition initiates a "case" rather
than a "proceeding." The shift in usage from "proceeding" to "case" occurred prior to enact-
ment of the Code.
2 Section 109 defines who may be a debtor. Subsection (b) states who may be a debtor
under Chapter 7; subsection (c) states who may be a debtor under Chapter 9; subsection (d)
states who may be a debtor under Chapter 11; and subsection (e) states who may be a debtor
under Chapter 13. Chapters 1, 3, 5, and 15 apply generally to cases commenced uner Chapters
7, 11, and 13. Chapter 1 and substantial portions of Chapters 3, 5, and 11 apply to cases under
Chapter 9. §§ 103(e) and 901.
21 H.R. 8200, the version of the Bankruptcy Code originally passed in the House, did not
require a petition to be filed with the bankruptcy court. S. 2266, however, designated the
place of filing as the bankruptcy court, and the House Managers acceded to the Senate on
this point. 124 CONG. REc. H11091 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)(statement by Rep. Edwards);
124 CONG. REc. S17497 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)(statement by Sen. DeConcini). [Citations to
Congressman Edwards' and Senator DeConcini's nearly identical statements in 124 CONG.
REC. H11089-11115, S17406-17432, explaining the changes made in the bills originally passed
by the House and Senate, are hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL REcORD.] The National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges urged that all petitions be filed in the bankruptcy court to
assure complete control by the court over all controversies and matters arising out of cases
filed under the bankruptcy laws. See generally Lee, A Critical Comparison of the Commission
Bill and the Judges' Bill for the Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 49 AM. BAKa. L.J. 1
(1975).
1 No answer to a voluntary petition in straight bankruptcy (i.e., for liquidation) or one
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Filing the petition results in an automatic entry of an order for relief under
the chapter invoked by the petition.3 1 The expression "order for relief"3 in
the Code is equivalent to adjudication under the Bankruptcy Act3 and is
tantamount to an order approving the court's exercise of jurisdiction to
grant relief pursuant to the provisions of the law. If the debtor is ineligible
or the petition is insufficient, however, the language of the statute does not
preclude the court from taking whatever action is appropriate to dispose
of the document .
3
Neither insolvency nor inability to pay debts nor even the fact that the
debtor is indebted in any amount is required to be alleged or proved under
section 301. Section 109(c) requires a municipality seeking relief under
Chapter 9, however, to show insolvency or inability to pay its debts, and
section 109(e) apparently requires a petitioner who files under Chapter 13
to owe both unsecured and secured debts that are liquidated and noncon-
tingent. The section, however, prescribes only the maximum and not the
minimum amount of the debt.3 5 The Bankruptcy Code requires no change
filed under Chapter IX, XI, XII, or XIII was authorized by the Bankruptcy Act or the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure. There were two exceptions to the general rule: R. BANKR. P. 9-
110(a)(2) authorized an answer to a voluntary petition under § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act to
be filed by a creditor, stockholder, or indenture trustee, and § 137 of the Act, and R. BANKR.
P. 10-112(a)(2) authorized a creditor or indenture trustee to controvert the allegations of a
petition filed by a debtor in a Chapter X case. If the Chapter X debtor was not insolvent,
any stockholder of the debtor could also file an answer.
11 Bankruptcy Code § 301 (2d sentence), 11 U.S.C.A. § 301(2d sentence) (1979).
31 Under Code § 102(6) the expression, "order for relief," means entry of an order for
relief.
3 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 321, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6277. The effect of the second sentence of § 301 is essentially the same as provided by § 18f
of the Bankruptcy Act. "Adjudication," as defined by § 1(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, meant
"a determination whether by decree or by operation of law, that a person is a bankrupt." "The
term adjudication is replaced by a less perjorative [sic] phrase in light of the clear power of
Congress to permit voluntary bankruptcy without the necessity for an adjudication, as under
the 1898 Act, which was adopted when voluntary bankruptcy was a concept not thoroughly
tested." HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 321, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6277.
The "Bankruptcy Act of 1973," drafted by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, had likewise substituted "order [or direction] for relief' for "adjudication."
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 9, § 4-210, at 79-80.
Guidelines issued by the Co-reporters for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules
suggest, in a proposed Rule 1001(2) that "adjudication" be read to mean "order for relief' in
all the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. The guidelines are further discussed in note 42 infra.
U The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure do not specify the manner of attacking the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court over a voluntary petition filed by an ineligible debtor, but
Rule 121 does indicate that certain rules in Part 7 apply in proceedings to vacate an adjudica-
tion. With a substitution of "order for relief" for "adjudication," this rule still applies under
the Cod6. See § 301. The Bankruptcy court would have no jurisdiction of a petition filed by
an ineligible debtor, and the petition would be subject to dismissal by a bankruptcy court
on the court's motion or on motion by a party in interest. See Seligon & King, Jurisdiction
and Venue in Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 38-40 (1962). Lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived by
a failure to object or delay in raising an objection to the court's jurisdiction.
n It is unlikely that the lack of "noncontingent, unliquidated" debts, secured or unse-
cured, will be held to render a petitioner ineligible for relief under Chapter 13, so long as the
1979]
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in the allegations that a voluntary petitioner must make to obtain relief
in a straight bankruptcy" or for adjustment of municipal indebtedness.
37
Inasmuch as voluntary petitions under Chapters VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, and
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act had to allege insolvency or inability to pay
debts, 38 however, there has been a liberalization of access by individuals,
partnerships, and corporations to the bankruptcy court for reorganization
and rehabilitation.
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure will continue to govern the form of the
petition and other aspects of practice and procedure not prescribed by the
Code. 9 The Supreme Court's rule-making authority in the area of bank-
r uptcy is circumscribed by the Code. However, the provision of the En-
abling Act nullifying laws inconsistent with the rules and forms promul-
gated by the Court was repealed. 0 Section 405(d) of Public Law No. 95-
598, nevertheless, provides that
[t]he rules prescribed under section 2075 of title 28 of the United
States Code and in effect on September 30, 1979, shall apply to
cases under title 11, to the extent not inconsistent with this Act,
until such rules are repealed or superseded by rules prescribed and
effective under such section, as amended by. . . this Act.
The Chief Justice has appointed an Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules and two Co-reporters to prepare and propose Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure to apply in cases under the new Code.4 Since section 2075 of
Title 28 requires rules promulgated pursuant to the section to be reported
to Congress by May 1, the Committee did not deem it feasible to under-
debtor schedules or alleges some indebtedness and requests relief under the Code.
31 The Bankruptcy Act did not require a voluntary petition for liquidation to contain any
allegation regarding the petitioner's financial condition. Official Form No. 1, promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to § 30 of the Bankruptcy Act, required a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy to allege that the petitioner owed debts, but that allegation was not required by
Official Form No. 1 promulgated by the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976), which
superseded § 30 of the Bankruptcy Act in 1964.
11 Section 84 of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by 90 Stat. 317, Act of Apr. 8, 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-260, like § 109(e) of the Code, required a petitioner under Chapter IX to allege
insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature.
1 See §§ 77(a), 84, 130(1), 323, 423, 623.
31 See 28 U.S.C. § 2075, as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, Title 1I, § 247, 92 Stat. 2672.
"O This lamentable change requiring rules and forms hereafter promulgated pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2075 to be consistent with Congressionally enacted laws, is discussed in Kennedy,
The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue,
and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY's L. J. 251, 304-09 (1979).
1' The Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules is Circuit Judge
Ruggero J. Aldisert of the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit. The other members are
Bankruptcy Judge Clive Bare, District Judge John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Professor Robert W.
Foster, Charles Horsky, Esq., Bankruptcy Judge Beryl E. McGuire (retired), Bankruptcy
Judge Asa Herzog (retired), Norman H. Nachman, Esq., Bankruptcy Judge Alexander L.
Paskay, Joseph Patchen, Esq., District Judge Morey L. Sear, and District Judge Morell E.
Sharp. The Co-reporters are Professors Lawrence P. King and Walter Taggart.
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take to propose any new rules to take effect before October 1, 1979, the
effective date of the Code. Guidelines have been prepared by the Commit-
tee and its Co-reporters, however, for the assistance of the bench and bar
in developing interim procedures pending the promulgation of new Rules.
The consolidation of the requirements of a voluntary petition into a
single section of the Code, along with the simplicity of those requirements,
permits the use of a single form with alternative recitals to permit designa-
tion of the chapter under which the petitioner seeks relief. Accordingly,
guidelines issued by the Co-reporters for the Advisory Committee on Bank-
ruptcy Rules have suggested the use of a single, simple form. 2 Schedules,
1 The guidelines issued by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules suggested a
Rule 1002 entitled "Debtor's Petition." This rule is suggested for use in lieu of Rules 103, 8-
102, 9-3, 10-104, 11-6, 12-6, and 13-103, which have heretofore governed the filing of voluntary
petitions under the several chapters of the Bankruptcy Act.
Subdivision (a) of suggested Rule 1002 requires a voluntary petition to conform substan-
tially to Form No. 1, which is an adaptation of Official Forms No. 1, 11-F1, 12-Fl, and 13-1.
The result is a considerable simplification of the petition to be filed in a reorganization case
by a debtor seeking relief of the kind formerly available only under Chapter VIII (§ 77) or
Chapter X. An argument may be made that the more elaborate recitals prescribed by Rules
8-102 and 10-104 and Official Forms No. 8-1 and 10-1 are still effective because not inconsist-
ent with the Bankruptcy Code, but the practical answer is that until a new set of Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure is promulgated in accordance with the enabling Act, practice and
procedure under the Code will be largely governed by local rules.
Rule 927 contemplates that local bankruptcy rules may be promulgated and amended
by a majority of the judges of each district court. Although the relationship between the
United States district court and the bankruptcy court is considerably more attenuated under
the Code than under the Bankruptcy Act, the grant of jurisdiction of cases and civil proceed-
ings to the district court by 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) and (b), as amended by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241, 92 Stat. 2668, should serve to sustain the power of
the district court to prescribe local rules for practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy
Code pending supersession of the existing rules by the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2075 (1976).
A Comment accompanying Rule 927 of the 1979 Collier Pamphlet Edition of the Bank-
ruptcy Rules declares that "Ea]fter October 1, 1979 the power to make local rules will be
vested in the bankruptcy court rather than the district court." The Comment then cites 28
U.S.C. §§ 156, 157, and 1471(c), added by §§ 201 and 241 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. The first cited section, however, goes no further than to authorize rules of the bank-
ruptcy court to provide for division of the business of a bankruptcy court having more than
one judge, and the second cited section goes no further than to authorize each bankruptcy
court to establish by local rule or order schedules of court sessions at designated places of
holding court other than at the headquarters office of the court. Section 1471(c) provides that
the bankruptcy court "shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the
district courts," but this jurisdictional grant can hardly be said to be inconsistent with Rule
927. In the existing state of uncertainty as to the locus of the power to prescribe local rules,
it is advisable for the bankruptcy judges and the district judges to act cooperatively and
jointly in promulgating such rules.
Although Rule 106 arguably remains effective and applicable because not inconsistent
with the Bankruptcy Code, a suggested new Rule 1005 has been drafted to prescribe a uniform
caption for a petition for a case filed under any chapter of Title 11.
Rule 109 and corresponding rules for cases filed under Chapters VIII-XII of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, which require verification of the petition, accompanying documents, and amend-
ments appear to remain applicable under the principle of noninconsistency, but the guide-
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lists of creditors, and statements of affairs are required to be filed by
statutory provisions that are generally consistent with the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure." The guidelines issued by the Co-reporters suggest,
however, a new Rule 1007 to accommodate particular needs for information
regarding creditors and equity security holders in a Chapter 11 case.
2. Eligible Debtors
Section 109 defines who may be a debtor under new Title 11. Subsec-
tion (a) makes it clear that only a person who resides in the United States,
or has a domicile, place of business, or property in the United States, may
be a debtor under Chapter 7, 11, or 13.1 Any person may be a debtor under
Chapter 7 unless excluded by one of the three paragraphs of section 109(b).
A "person" is defined in section 101(30) to include an individual partner-
ship, and a corporation.45 A governmental unit is not included, 6 but if it
lines of the Co-reporters have suggested an unsworn declaration be added at the end of each
of these papers pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (1976). A signed certification "under the penalty
of perjury" is given the same effect under the statute as a verification.
Rule 1002 suggested as a guideline by the Co-reporters includes new requirements regard-
ing the number and routing of copies of petitions, and a new Rule X-1002 prescribes that the
United States trustee shall get a copy of a petition and of all related documents in a pilot
district. A pilot district is one of eighteen such districts designated for an experiment to be
conducted under the supervision of the Attorney General between October 1, 1979, and April
1, 1984. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1501 (1979). The experiment is designed to discover the feasibility
and desirability of a system of bankruptcy administration employing an official trustee with
responsibility for supervising administration of cases and trustees in cases under Chapters 7,
11, and 13 and acting as trustee in certain cases under Chapters 7 and 13.
Compare § 521(1) with R. BANKR. P. 108.
" This limitation of eligibility is consistent with the result that would be reached under
§ 2a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act. See Comment, 35 N.C. L. REv. 476, 477-78 (1957).
"' The chauvinistic inclusion of "women" in the definition of "persons" in § 1(23) of the
Bankruptcy Act is omitted from 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(30) (1979). The word "partnership"
remains undefined in the Code. Therefore, what constitutes a partnership is left to nonbank-
ruptcy law. See 1A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5.02 (14th ed. 1974)[hereinafter cited as
COLLIER]. The word "corporation" is defined in § 101(8) of the Code in much the same way
as it is defined in § 1(8) of the Bankruptcy Act. The word is defined in both places to include
unincorporated organizations. Since the corporateness of the debtor is not material in deter-
mining eligibility or amenability of a debtor for relief under the new law, the definition has
less significance under the new law than it had under the old.
The HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 309, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 626,
noted that the new definition of a debtor "is intended specifically to include a labor union"
and overrules In re Freight Drivers Local No. 600, 432 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
That decision, which was an erroneous construction of the Bankruptcy Act, already has been
reversed in Gordon Transports, Inc. v. Highway & City Frt. Drivers, Local No. 600, 576 F.2d
1285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 612 (1978).
A municipality may not be a debtor under Chapter 7 because it is not a person. See §
101(14), (29), (30).
" A "governmental unit" means "United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Terri-
tory; municipality; foreign state; department; agency, or instrumentality of the United
States, a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state,
or other foreign or domestic government." § 101(21). A "governmental unit," along with a
"person, estate, [or] trust," is included in the term "entity." § 101(14).
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is a municipality, defined as a "political subdivision or public agency or
instrumentality of a State, '4 7 it may be a debtor under Chapter 9 but
not any other chapter." Three groups of persons are excluded from eligibil-
ity from relief under Chapter 7: (1) a railroad;49 (2) a domestic insurance
company,5" bank,"' savings bank, 2 cooperative bank,53 savings and loan
association,54 building and loan association," homestead association," or
'7 Section 101(29).
Section 109(c).
' Section 109(b)(1). A railroad is defined in § 101(33) as a "common carrier by railroad
engaged in the transportation of individuals or property or owner of trackage facilities leased
by such common carrier." The definition is a modification of the term "railroad corporation"
as used in § 77(m) of the Bankruptcy Act, which had required that such a corporation be
engaged in interstate commerce. The most plausible explanation for including the limitation
in § 77 is that Congress had doubts in 1933 when § 77 was enacted that its power to provide
for reorganization of railroads extended to an intrastate carrier. See HousE REPORT supra note
17, at 313, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6270.
50 Section 109(b)(2). Section 4 of the Barkruptcy Act, in subsections (a) and (b), ex-
cluded insurance corporations from eligibility and amenability as bankrupts. Although
"corporation" was defined in § 1(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, to include an unincorporated
association, the term is not as broad as "company," which may include a partnership or
conceivably an individual entrepreneur. A foreign insurance corporation engaged in the insur-
ance business in the United States, as well as a domestic insurance corporation, was no doubt
excluded from the eligibility as a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act.
51 Section 109(b)(2). Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act excluded a banking corporation
from eligibility and amenability as a bankrupt. Several cases have held that partnerships and
individuals engaged in banking were eligible for relief under the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g.,
In re Faour, 72 F.2d 719, 720(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 613 (1934)(individual); Fahey
v. Sapio, 30 F.2d 330, 331-32 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 871 (1929)(partnership);
Missouri v. Angle, 236 F. 644, 650 (8th Cir. 1916)(individual); Dickas v. Barnes, 140 F. 849,
851-52 (6th Cir. 1905)(partnership). The exclusion by § 109(b) of a bank without regard to
the form of its organization overrules these cases. A foreign banking corporation doing busi-
ness in the United States as well as a domestic banking corporation was probably excluded
from eligibility as a bankrupt or debtor under the Bankruptcy Act. Cf. text accompanying
notes 61, 62, 69 & 70 infra.
52 Section 109(b)(2). A savings bank is a new category of excluded persons, but a savings
bank constituting a corporation within the broad definition of § 1(8) of the Bankruptcy Act
was undoubtedly excluded by § 4 of that Act.
" Section 109(b)(2). A cooperative bank is a new category of excluded persons but was
undoubtedly excluded under the Bankruptcy Act as a banking corporation. See note 52 supra.
5' Section 109(b)(2). A savings and loan association is generally regarded as another
name for a building and loan association. Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The
Excluded Corporations, 42 MNN. L. REv. 171, 198 (1957)[hereinafter cited as Sovern]. But
see Clemons v. Liberty Sav. & Real Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1932) (corporation
"organized to do a general savings and loan business" held to be neither a bank nor a building
and loan association). Both a building and loan association and a savings and loan association
receive funds from small investors primarily for use in financing home purchases. See Sovern,
supra, at 199.
s Section 109(b)(2). A buildhg and loan association was excluded by an amendment of
§ 4 of the Bankruptcy Act, made by Act of Feb. 11, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-27, Ch. 38, 47 Stat.
47. Such an association had theretofore been held amenable to an involuntary petition under
the Bankruptcy Act. In re Bay Cities Guaranty Building-Loan Ass'n, 48 F.2d 623, 624-25
(S.D. Cal. 1931). An objection was raised to the 1932 amendment of § 4 because two states
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credit union;57 and (3) a foreign entity like any of those listed in the second
group but engaged in business in the United States." The exclusion of a
railroad continues a limitation on the court's jurisdiction in a liquidation
case under the Bankruptcy Act,59 but the assumption underlying the limi-
tation that a railroad should not be liquidated is no longer valid. Thus a
railroad may be liquidated in a case under Chapter 11.10 The exclusions of
the second and third groups of persons, most of whom also were excluded
by the Bankruptcy Act,8 are premised on a Congressional reluctance to
displace established modes of administration of the estates of excepted
had no laws controlling building and loan associations. The report of the House Committee
on the Judiciary accompanying the amendment, however, explained that state equity and
insolvency laws may be invoked to obtain administration of the affairs of such an association.
H.R. REP. No. 98, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1952).
" Section 109(b)(2). A homestead association is a new category of excluded persons. The
exclusion overrules Missco Homestead Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.2d 280, 282 (8th
Cir. 1950)(corporation formed to borrow money from the United States to obtain real estate
for sublease to tenant farmers held subject to bankruptcy under § 4 of the Bankruptcy Act).
s' Section 109(b)(2). A credit union was not excluded under the Bankruptcy Act.
Section 109(b)(3).
' Bankruptcy Act § 4a & b.
Section 1174.
" The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws considered whether the exclusions of building
and loan associations and insurance and banking corporations should be retained in the Code.
The Commission acknowledged that a number of prevalent problems concerning these organi-
zations might be solved by appropriately drafted bankruptcy legislation but recognized that
other difficulties would be engendered by such legislation. The availability of federal insur-
ance was thought to mitigate, if it did not eliminate, most of the problems arising out of
insolvencies of banking corporations and building and loan associations. The argument for
bankruptcy jurisdiction of insurance corporations was stronger, but the Commission was
persuaded by considerations set out in a memorandum prepared by Professor Spencer Kim-
ball not to propose the extension of bankruptcy laws to insurance corporations. COMMISSION
REPORT I, supra note 1, at 72, 183-84, 223 n. 12.
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges proposed in a bill, introduced as H.R.
32 in the 94th Congress, 1st Session, that insurance corporations no longer be excluded from
the Bankruptcy Act. Not surprisingly, the American Life Insurance Association strongly
opposed the proposal of the Bankruptcy Judges. Hearings, supra note 13, at 1582-84, 1620-22
(statement and testimony of John J. Creedon for the American Life Ins. Ass'n).
The National Bankruptcy Conference appointed a special committee to study the desira-
bility and feasibility of bankruptcy legislation applicable to insurance companies and foreign
banks. The committee recommended an extension of the bankruptcy laws to foreign banks
not doing business in the United States. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REVISED REPORT
ON FOREIGN BANKS OF THE SPECIAL COMM. ON INSURANCE COMPANIES AND FOREIGN BANKS 30-31
(1976). The National Bankruptcy Conference approved this recommendation and submitted
it as part of its proposed "Bankruptcy Act of 1975" to the House Judiciary Committee.
Hearings, supra note 13, Appendix, Ser. No. 27, at 349-51. With respect to insurance compa-
nies, the special committee prepared a careful report, at the end of which it concluded that
the ultimate answer to the question whether insurance companies should be brought within
the scope of the bankruptcy laws required extended study and recommended continuation of
the exclusion pending the completion of such a study. REPORT ON INSURANCE COMPANIES OF
THE SPECIAL COMMrrEE ON INSURANCE COMPANIES AND FOREIGN BANKS 28 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON INSURANCE COMPANIES]. The recommendation respecting foreign banks
eventuated in the enactment of § 303(k).
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organizations.2 Like the Bankruptcy Act, the Code leaves undefined the
terms used in identifying the kinds of persons excluded from eligibility and
amenability, and neither the Code nor the legislative history undertakes
to resolve the question whether the terms should be given a uniform mean-
ing or whether they should depend on the state or other nonbankruptcy
law. If state law provides the systems of administration for the categories
of persons specified in the second and third groups of excluded persons it
is appropriate for the courts to look to that law in determining whether a
particular debtor fits into one of the excluded classes. The case law that
developed under the Bankruptcy Act, however, tended to rely on state
classification when the question was whether a particular debtor was ex-
cluded, as an insurance corporation, 3 and applied a uniform or federal test
when the question was whether an excluded banking corporation was in-
volved." The cases also were split on the question whether the powers
granted a corporation should be determinative, or whether its activities
should be more significant. 5 The Code and its legislative history do not
clearly opt for giving a federal or state-oriented content to the exclusion-
ary words, but the fact that none of the excluded persons need be a corpo-
62 See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 318, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6265; SEN. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5817 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. Dean Sovern has shown that
the reluctance to make domestic and foreign insurance companies, banks, savings banks, etc.,
eligible for relief under Chapter 7 rests on quite insubstantial evidence of legislative intent.
Sovern, supra note 54, at 172-82. See Samuels, Unregulated Foreign Banks in Bankruptcy:
Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act, 23 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 47, 73-76 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Samuels]. Dean Sovern acknowledged that there are sufficient differences between insurance
and state banking corporations and state building and loan associations, on the one hand,
and most other corporate debtors, on the other, to warrant excluding the former category from
eligibility and amenability under the general bankruptcy laws, but suggested enactment of
special chapters of the bankruptcy laws designed to deal with their particular problems.
Sovem, supra note 54, at 243. The draftsmen of section 109(b)(2) and (3) have ignored Dean
Sovern's analysis of the legislative history and suggestions for reform and have instead en-
larged the exclusions of financial institutions from eligibility and amenability of debtors
under the bankruptcy laws. See SENATE REPORT, supra, at 31, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5817. The only explanation given in the legislative history is a cryptic reference
to "the change in various banking laws since the current law was last amended on this point."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 318, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6275; SENATE
REPORT, supra, at 31, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 5817.
'3 Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 451 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608
(1943); Sovern, supra note 54, at 182-91, 194-98, 205.
" In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935); Sovern,
supra note 54, at 191-94, 205.
's Compare In re Union Guarantee & Mtge. Co., 75 F.2d 984, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
296 U.S. 594 (1935)(company empowered to issue insurance policies held to be excluded as
an insurance corporation), and Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.), appeal
dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930)(lack of power to accept deposits
held conclusive that debtor was not bank), with In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity,
286 F. 180, 188 (N.D. Ga. 1923)(company issuing several forms of insurance held to be
insurance corporation) and Clemons v. Liberty Sav. & Real Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450
(5th Cir. 1932)(corporation held not a bank although empowered to receive deposits).
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ration means that more deference should be given to activities of the
debtor than to its powers.
When a petition by or against a debtor was challenged under the Bank-
ruptcy Act on the ground that the debtor was a bank, the crucial question
was whether the debtor received deposits.6 A negative answer was usually
dispositive, 7 but an affirmative answer might lead to a consideration of
other factors.6" Whether or not a debtor receives deposits is likely to con-
tinue to be significant in determining whether a debtor is one of the three
varieties of excluded banks under the Bankruptcy Code.
Foreign insurance and financial institutions engaged in business in the
United States are excluded from eligibility and amenability under the
Bankruptcy Code on the same premise as that underlying the immunity
of domestic institutions of the same kind. The corollary of this last exclu-
sion is that a foreign insurance company, a foreign bank, or other foreign
financial institution may be a debtor under the new bankruptcy law if it
is not engaged in business in the United States but does have property
here. The law thus adopts the approach taken in Israel-British Bank (Lon-
don) Ltd. v. FDIC,"5 which held that a foreign bank not engaged in the
banking business in this country was not a banking corporation within the
meaning of section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act. The rationale for permitting
relief under Title 11 concerning a foreign financial company not doing
business here is based on the absence of any nonbankruptcy law of this
country governing liquidation and rehabilitation of such an organization30
Conditioning bankruptcy jurisdiction over a foreign financial institution
on the fact that it does not do business in the United States may be
questioned on the ground that nonbankruptcy relief in this country for
such a debtor is not inferior in availability or effectiveness to that provided
a foreign financial institution doing business here.71 Such an argument,
" See, e.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1935)(debtor held not to be a
banking corporation); Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334, 336-37 (5th Cir.
1934)(debtor held to be a banking corporation).
" See, e.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1935); Gamble v. Daniel, 39
F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1930).
" See, e.g., Clemons v. Liberty Sav. & Real Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir.
1932)(corporation's many powers to engage in transactions involving real estate, choses in
action, and construction, without power to permit depositors to withdraw funds by check,
considered); In re Bay Cities Guaranty Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 48 F.2d 623 (S.D. Cal. 1931)(inabil-
ity of depositors to draw checks on their deposits negated classification as bank).
'1 536 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976). The decision is subjected
to extended criticism in Samuels, supra note 62, at 48, 68-76.
70 After referring to the explicit coverage of foreign banks and insurance companies in §
109(b)(3), the legislative reports explained that banking institutions and insurance compa-
nies are excluded because "alternative provision is made for their liquidation under various
regulatory laws." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 318, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6275; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 31, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5817.
7' Cf. Sanuels, supra note 62, at 72-92. Only ten American states and the District of
Columbia permit foreign banks to do business within their jurisdictions. Hablutzel & Lutz,
Foreign Banks in the United States After the International Banking Act of 1978: The New
[Vol. XXXVI
THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE
however, goes more to raise doubts about the wisdom of excluding any
financial institution from eligibility and amenability under the bank-
ruptcy laws than about the propriety of differentiating between foreign
companies that engage in business in this country and those that do not.
2
Access to relief under Chapter 9 is restricted to a municipality. 3 While
there is no requirement that the municipality be located in the United
States, the municipality must be "generally authorized to be a debtor
under such chapter by State law or by a governmental officer or organiza-
tion empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under
such chapter."74 Since there is no counterpart in the new law to the defini-
tion of "States" in section 1(29) of the Bankruptcy Act, it appears that
neither Washington, D.C., nor San Juan, Puerto Rico, nor any other city
or political unit located in a territory or a possession of the United States
can be a debtor under Chapter 9.75 There are other limitations on the
Dual System, 96 BANKING L.J. 133, 141-42 (1979). Section 4 of the International Banking Act
of 1978, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3102(a)(1979 cum. supp.), authorizes the Comptroller of the Currency
to issue a federal charter to a foreign bank to establish an agency or branch in any of 32 states
that neither permit nor prohibit foreign bank operations.
11 A principal advantage of bankruptcy relief is the availability of the avoiding powers
of the trustee. Samuels, supra note 62, at 81. Another is the nationwide scope of the court's
jurisdiction and the feasibility of a unitary administration. Id.; Sovern, supra note 64, at 215.
Professor Samuels has pointed out that a domestic bank with assets in one state but subject
to regulation only by another state is in much the same position as a foreign bank with
property but not doing business in the United States. Samuels, supra note 62, at 98. It is not
easily explicable why the advantages of bankruptcy relief should be available in a case
involving a financial institution or insurance company only if it is not doing business in this
country.
" Section 109(c)(1). A "municipality" is defined in section 101(29) as a "political subdi-
vision or public agency or instrumentality of a State."
T' Section 109(c)(2).
7 While there may be special reasons why Washington, D.C., should not be eligible for
relief under Chapter 9, it is not self-evident why all political subdivisions, public agencies,
and instrumentalities in Puerto Rico, Guam, and other territories and possessions of the
United States should be precluded from relief under the chapter. S. 658, which passed the
Senate on September 7, 1979, included a new 11 U.S.C. § 101(37A), defining "State" to
include "the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Panama Canal Zone, the District of Colum-
bia, and any territory or possession of the United States." It was explained in SEN. REP. No.
96-305, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979), that "[these governmental units were inadvertently
left out of the definition of 'state' during the passage of the Reform Act." There was actually
no definition of "state" in the Bankruptcy Reform Act. S. 658 also included a new 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(9), defining "United States" to include the governmental units listed in the proposed
definition of "State". It was explained in SEN. REP. No. 96-305, supra at 3, that the amend-
ment was necessary to make clear that the law applied to debtors residing, having their
domiciles, or having property in the areas mentioned. A Committee Print offered by Con-
gressman Edwards in the House on October 22, 1979, as a substitute for S. 658 made no
relevant change in § 101 but added the following two new paragraphs to § 102:
(9) 'United States', when used in a geographical sense, includes all locations where the
judicial jurisdiction of the United States extends, including territiories in possession of the
United States; and
(10) except for the purposes of who may be a debtor in Chapter 9 of this title, "State"
includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.
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availability of relief under section 109(c). The municipality must be insol-
vent or unable to meet its debts as they mature, must desire to effect a
debt adjustment plan, or, unless excused, must have obtained an agree-
ment of a majority of the creditors intended to be affected through the
proposed plan. 6 The requirement of agreement of a majority of the credi-
tors to the debtor's proposed plan is excused if the debtor has unsuccess-
fully negotiated in good faith, is unable to negotiate because such negotia-
tion is impracticable, or reasonably believes a creditor may attempt to
obtain a preference."
Only a person who may be a debtor under Chapter 7 may be a debtor
under Chapter 11, except that a railroad may be a debtor under Chapter
11.11 Two classes of persons eligible for relief under Chapter 7, but not
Chapter 11, are stockbrokers and commodity brokers."
Finally, Chapter 13 affords relief to an individual with regular income
who owes at the time of the filing of the petition unsecured debts of less
than $100,000 and secured debts of less than $350,000.80 The individual's
spouse may be a joint petitioner under Chapter 13.81 No stockbroker or
11 Section 109(c)(3), (4), &(5). The majority of creditors required to agree to a Chapter 9
plan is a number of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of the claims of each class
that the debtor intends to impair under the plan it is proposing. Section 901 makes applicable
in a Chapter 9 case the definition of impairment set out in § 1124.
11 The requirements of § 109(c) of the Code are substantially a restatement of § 84 of
the Bankruptcy Act.
78 Section 109(d).
7g A "stockbroker" is defined in § 101(39) as a person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions and securities for the account of others or with members of the general public,
from or for his own account. A "commodity broker" is defined in § 101(5) as a "futures
commission merchant, foreign futures commission merchant, clearing organization, leverage
transaction merchant, or commodity options dealer . . . ." Bankruptcy relief concerning
stockbrokers and commodity brokers is governed exclusively by Subchapters Ill and IV of
Chapter 7.
88 Section 109(e). An "individual with regular income" is defined in § 101(24) as an
"individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make
payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or commodity
broker." The purpose and effect of §§ 101(24) and 109(e) are to enable sole proprietors of small
businesses, as well as wage earners, to obtain relief under Chapter 13. A husband and wife
engaged in operating a "mom & pop grocery store" may thus seek relief under Chapter 13 or
under Chapter 11. If the spouses are a partnership, however, the partnership is eligible for
relief only under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, but that does not appear to preclude or prejudice
the availability of relief of the spouses as individuals under Chapter 13. See HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 320, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6277.
81 Section 109(e) authorizes an individual with regular income, or an individual with
regular income and his or her spouse, to file a petition under Chapter 13. Thus an individual
without regular income may not be a sole petitioner under Chapter 13, even though married
to an individual with regular income. When spouses file under Chapter 13, their debts are
combined, and the ceilings are applied to them as if they were a single petitioner. In discuss-
ing the eligibility of a husband and wife engaged in the grocery business as joint petitioners
under Chapter 13, the HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 320, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6277, stated that the crucial issue is "whether the assets of the grocery store are for
the benefit of all creditors of the debtor or only for business creditors. ... This explanation
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commodity broker is eligible for relief under Chapter 13.2 In computing the
indebtedness which must not exceed the ceiling, only noncontingent, liqui-
dated indebtedness is considered."
3. Filing Fees
Filing fees are prescribed by section 1930 of Title 28 of the United
States Code. 4 Until a very late date in the legislative process, the bank-
ruptcy bills contemplated that, as recommended by the Comission on
Bankruptcy Laws," an in forma pauperis petition would be as available
is hardly illuminating, and the scope of Chapter 13 is further beclouded by a statement that
"[tlhe intent of the section is to follow current law that a partnership by estoppel may be
adjudicated in bankruptcy and therefore would not prevent a Chapter 13 debtor from subject-
ing assets in such a partnership to the reach of all creditors in a Chapter 13 case." Id. The
law has generally been understood not to authorize an adjudication of a partnership by
estoppel under the Bankruptcy Act. See In re Hudson Clothing Co., 148 F. 305, 307 (D. Me.
1906), aff'd sub nom. Manson v. Wiliams, 153 F. 525 (1st Cir. 1907), affl'd, 213 U.S. 453 (1909);
In re Kenney, 97 F. 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), affl'd, 105 F. 897 (2d Cir. 1900), aff'd sub nom.
Clarke v. Larremore, 188 U.S. 486 (1903); Tatum v. Acadian Production Corp. of La., 35 F.
Supp. 40, 45 (E.D. La. 1940); cf. In re Evans, 161 F. 590, 591 (N.D. Ga. 1908). Moreover, if
the estate of a partnership by estoppel were subject to administration as a separate entity in
bankruptcy, the rights of the creditors of the individual members of the partnership in the
partnership property would be subject to the right of the creditors of the partnership, who
could first satisfy their claims out of that property. The individual partners' creditors would
be entitled to reach the partnership property only if there was a surplus. See HousE
REPORT,SUpra note 17, at 199. It is thus likely that the authors of the Report meant to say
that if the husband and wife were members of a partnership by estoppel, that fact would not
prevent either debtor or both debtors from filing a Chapter 13 petition. If one spouse should
file, his or her creditors would be entitled to insist that a confirmed plan distribute property
of value equal to their share of the property of the debtor without any priority for partnership
creditors. Likewise, if both spouses should file, their creditors and the creditors of each would
be entitled to distribution without subordination to the rights of any partnership creditors.
The rewriting of the discussion of § 109(e) in the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 320,
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6277, as suggested above, is supported by this
additional sentence in the REPORT: "However, if the partnership is found to be a partnership
by agreement, even informal agreement, then a separate entity exists and the assets of that
entity would be exempt from a case under Chapter 13." That statement is also confusing,
however, insofar as it purports to confer an exemption on assets of a consensual partnership
from the claims of creditors under Chapter 13. All the property of a Chapter 13 debtor,
including his or her interest in a partnership or a corporation, should enter into the calcula-
tion of whether a plan proposed for confirmation under § 1325(a)(4) will yield a distribution
equal to that of a liquidation under Chapter 7.
" See note 79 supra.
Section 109(e).
" See § 246 of Title I, Act of November 6, 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2671.
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 9; COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 58-
59. The Supreme Court ruled, by a five-to-four vote, that the bankruptcy Act precluded the
filing of an in forma pauperis petition in bankruptcy and that it was constitutional for
Congress to limit relief to petitioners who can pay filing fees. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S.
434, 436 (1973). The Commission had concluded from a study of the experience in states
where the prevailing law permitted the filing of in forma pauperis petitions in bankruptcy
that no significant increase in filings would result. COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 9,
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in the bankruptcy court as it is in other federal courts pursuant to section
1915 of title 28.1' As finally enacted, however, section 1930 requires a pay-
ment to the clerk of the bankruptcy court of a filing fee for any case
commenced under the Act, "[nlotwithstanding section 1915 of this title."
At the same time, filing fees are substantially increased:
(1) for a case commenced under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, $60;
(2) for a case commenced under Chapter 9, $300;
(3) for a case commenced under Chapter 11 by or against a debtor
other than a railroad, $200; and
(4) for a case commenced under Chapter 11 by or against a railroad,
$500.
An individual commencing a voluntary case under section 301 is au-
thorized to pay filing fees in installments. The permissible payment period
and the number of installments will be governed by Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure. 7 In explaining the increase in filing fees, the House and Senate
managers of the bill pointed out that the new legislation abolishes the
referees' salary and expense fund, "which was established long ago in an
era when the bankruptcy courts were supposed to be self-supporting."
The explanation concluded that "[t]he referee salary and expense fund
has been running a deficit for several years and deleting it serves to bring
the bankruptcy court into line with all other Federal courts."89 In a curious
and confusing observation by the managers, the increase of filing fees was
said to treat "bankruptcy cases identical with other Federal court cases
and comports with dollar values appropriate in 1978 for gaining access to
a Federal court." 90
11, see Shuchman, Theory and Reality in Bankruptcy: The Spherical Chicken, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 66, 86-88 (1977).
" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 449, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS at 6404.
Rule 107(b) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permitted four monthly installments
and an extension of up to six months after the date of the filing of the petition. The Co-
reporter's guidelines have suggested a new Rule 1006 that tracks Rule 107(b) with minor
modifications: (1) In conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a), only an individual may apply for
permission to pay fees in installments; (2) the application is to be accepted by, and payments
of the fees are to be made to, the clerk of the bankruptcy court rather than of the district
court; and (3) the requirement of Rule 107(b)(3) that filing fees must be paid in full before
the bankrupt may pay his attorney for his services is omitted. Since suggested Interim Rule
1006(b)(2) is almost a verbatim copy of Bankruptcy Rule 107(b)(2), the omission of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 107(b) (3) presumably represents a judgment by the new Advisory Committee on
Bankruptcy Rules that the requirement that a debtor pay his filing fees before he pays his
attorney is inconsistent with the new Bankruptcy Reform Act. If so, the conflict is not
incontrovertibly clear.
- Congressional Record, supra note 29, at H11108 and S17425.
xg Id.
"1 Id. The statement regarding identity of treatment of bankruptcy cases and other
federal court cases presumably has reference to the fact that 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) was amended
by § 244 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to increase the fee for filing a civil action in a
United States district court from $15 to $60. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 244, 92 Stat. 2671. This change undoubtedly surprised many lawyers for plaintiffs
who commenced actions in federal courts on and after October 1, 1979.
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B. Joint Cases-Section 302
Section 302 authorizes the initiation of a joint case by an individual and
his or her spouse. A joint case is commenced only by the filing with the
bankruptcy court of a single petition. The result of the filing of the petition
is an automatic entry of an order for relief. Such a petition may be filed
under Chapter 7, Chapter 11, or Chapter 13. 91 As in a voluntary case
commenced under section 301, a petition in a joint case need not allege
insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature. Since a joint case is
really a single case, although there are two petitioners and two debtors,
only one filing fee is payable under section 1930(a). Moreover, the fee in a
joint case may be paid in installments.2
Prior to the promulgation of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, a joint
petition could be filed concerning only a partnership and one or more
partners, but that authorization was withdrawn by the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure. The reason for the abolition of the joint petition in
cases involving partnerships was that such petitions created more prob-
lems and difficulties than they solved. Section 302 does not preclude the
possibility of the filing of a petition by a husband and wife who are part-
ners, but if the partnirship is to be a debtor in the case, the petition for
the partnership must be filed pursuant to section 301. Moreover, a petition
for relief under Chapter 13 cannot be filed for the partnership since only
individuals are eligible for relief under that chapter. 4
Section 302(b) requires the court to determine, after the commence-
ment of a joint case, "the extent, if any, to which the debtor's estate shall
be consolidated." In such a case it is inferable that a single trustee will be
appointed for the consolidated estates." The consolidation of estates under
, Section 109(b), (d), & (e). Section 109(a) also requires that both spouses must satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement that the debtor reside or have a domicile, place of business, or
property in the United States.
32 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(last sentence).
'5 See the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 105 and 117(b) of the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedures. The Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were promulgated by the Supreme Court in
1973-76 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1976) and are published in the United States Code
immediately following Title 11. The Rules remain effective under the Bankruptcy Code to
the extent not inconsistent with the Code until repealed or superseded by rules promulgated
pursuant to the congressional enabling act as amended by § 247 of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. The amendment eliminated a provision nullifying laws in conflict with rules
promulgated under the enabling act. See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
21 See note 81 supra.
15 According to the legislative reports, § 302(b) "is designed mainly for ease of adminis-
tration." HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 321, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6277;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 32, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5818. Adminis-
tration of consolidated estates by more than one trustee is unlikely to make for ease of
administration.
Section 701(a) requires the court in a liquidation case to appoint a disinterested person
to serve as interim trustee in a case promptly after an order for relief is entered under Chapter
7, which means promptly after the petition is filed in a voluntary case. Section 15701, which
applies in the 18 pilot project districts, requires the United States trustee to make the
1979]
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section 302(b) involves more than the appointment or election of a single
trustee, however, as the legislative reports indicated" that consolidation
means the combination of the spouses' assets and liabilities "in a single
pool" to pay creditors. The Reports indicated that the relevant factors in
the court's determination whether to order consolidation "include the ex-
tent of jointly held property and the amount of jointly-owned debts.
'9 7
Inferably, the key to the question of whether to order consolidation is "ease
of administration."98 Neither the statute nor the courts are free, however,
to disregard constitutional limitations in ordering consolidation. If H, who
has $10,000 worth of nonexempt property and $20,000 in liabilities, marries
W, who has $20,000 in assets and $10,000 in liabilities, the creditors of W
may object on constitutional grounds to the consolidation of H's and W's
estates and distribution pro rata to the creditors of each.9 Without ac-
knowledging constitutional difficulties, the legislative reports conceded
that the section is not a "license to consolidate in order to avoid other
provisions of the title to the detriment of either the debtors or their credi-
tors.""' In any event, it appears that section 302 contemplates joint admin-
istration of the estates of the joint petitioners as a matter of procedure in
all cases, and that Rule 117 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which
leaves joint administration of estates to the discretion of the court, is
modified by the Code insofar as the estates of a husband and wife as joint
petitioners are concerned.'9 '
appointment. Since the filing of a petition by spouses commences a "joint case," these
sections evidently contemplate the appointment of a single trustee. Query, however, whether,
after the court has determined on consolidation of spouses' estates, the creditors of either
spouse may not insist on a right to elect their own trustee? Cf. Rule 210(b) of the Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. The court should in any event order the appointment, or authorize
the election, of separate trustees for the two spouses' estates whenever warranted by an
apparent conflict of interest.
1, HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 321, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6277;
Senate Report, supra note 62, at 32, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5818.
97 Id.
I d.
" See Seligson & Mandell, Multi-Debtor Petition - Consolidation of Debtors and Due
Process of Law, 73 COM. L.J. 341 (1968). See also Berry, Consolidation in Bankruptcy, 50 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 343, 357-62 (1976); Kennedy, Insolvency and the Corporate Veil in the United
States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COMPARATIVE LAW 233, 248-
55 (1971).
Professor Landers does not believe that the hypothetical case supposed in the text will
arise very often. See Landers, The Bankrupt's Spouse: The Forgotten Character in The
Bankruptcy Drama, 1974 UTAH L. REV. 709, 753 [hereinafter cited as Landers]. Professors
Landers and Richard Posner have engaged in debate as to the appropriateness of consolida-
tion of assets and liabilities of affiliated corporations. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent,
Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 589, 628-51 (1975);
Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 499, 518-26
(1976); Landers, Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 527, 531, 538 (1976).
"I See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 321, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6277, SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 32, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5818.
"0 Only Rule 117(b)(1) appears to be inconsistent with the Code and then only when a
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Section 302 appears to be a response to Professor Jonathan Landers'
call for specific provisions in the bankruptcy law addressed to "the unique
problems present in the husband-wife situation."' 1 2 Professor Landers
argued that consolidation is desirable in nearly all husband-wife bankrupt-
cies.0 3 He noted that a husband and wife are a single entity for joint
purchases and many other purposes and that purchases are made and
debts are incurred by either or both without regard to whether the intended
or actual beneficiary is the actual purchaser or both spouses. Commingling
of assets and joint record-keeping are commonplace and facilitated by
prevailing commercial practice, and creditors' expectations are predicated
on an assumption of joint activity and joint liability."'4 Therefore, to resist
consolidation Professor Landers would require creditors to show that the
husband and wife kept their activities separate. Creditors would have to
identify separately the assets each spouse brought to the marriage, the
earnings or other income of each, and to trace these funds to personal
expenditures by each, including those for support and investment. Profes-
sor Landers cited a number of cases approving Consolidation in husband-
wife bankruptcies.10 He acknowledged that most of the cases arose out of
efforts by the trustee to reach entireties property, particularly in the
Fourth Circuit, where the courts are notoriously zealous to prevent spouses
from exploiting the immunity of entireties property from levy by creditors
of either spouse. 06 The Code takes a long step toward reducing the necess-
ity for the trustee to rely on consolidation as a technique for reaching
entireties property, by enabling the trustee to sell the debtor's interest in
a tenancy by the entirety to the extent it is not exempt. 07 This reform,
recommended by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws, 0 8 was trun-
cated by a provision included in the exemption section of the Code permit-
ting a debtor to invoke by election the immunity given his interest in an
estate by the entirety by the nonbankruptcy law of his domicile.0 0 The
husband and wife are joint petitioners under § 302. There is no indication that a husband
and wife are required to file jointly.
'" See Landers, supra note 99, at 759.
" Id. at 754.
204 Id. at 753.
' See Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1960); In re Pennell, 15 F.
Supp. 743 (W.D. Pa. 1935).
I" See In re Seats, 538 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1976); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th
Cir. 1931).
' See §§ 363(h) & 522(b)(1).
'a' COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 192.
"' Section 522(b)(2)(B). The option to elect the law of one's domicile is available to any
debtor who has had a domicile in a state affording such as immunity for the 180 days
preceding the filing of the petition or for a longer portion of the 180-day period than in any
other place. If the debtor opts for a federal package of exemption provided by § 522(d), the
immunity of the interest in property held by the entirety under nonbankruptcy law is unavail-
able to the debtor. A state may, however, bar its domiciliaries from electing the federal
exemption, by virtue of a curious provision added to § 522(b)(1) at a late stage in the
congressional proceedings at the instance of Senator Wallop and others. 124 Cong. Rec.
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cases that have allowed a trustee of both spouses' estates to sell their
interests in nonexempt property held by the entirety"0 are still viable
under the Code, however, and constitute a shoal for counsel considering
the possibility of filing a joint petition on behalf of debtors who are tenants
by the entirety."'
C. Involuntary Cases-Section 303
1. Amenable Debtors
An involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapter 7, where
liquidation is the objective,"' or Chapter 11, where reorganization is the
objective."' To be a debtor in an involuntary case under either of these
chapters, a person must be eligible to be a voluntary petitioner under the
chapter chosen. This requirement excludes a railroad under Chapter 7 but
not under Chapter 11' '" and also excludes under either chapter an insur-
ance company or a financial institution of any of the kinds catalogued in
subsections 109(b)(2) and (3) of Title 11."15 There are three further exclu-
sions from amenability to an invoiuntary case, namely, a farmer, a corpo-
ration that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation,"' and
a foreign bank not engaged in the banking business in the United States.
A foreign bank can be a debtor in an involuntary petition filed only under
Chapter 7, and then only if a foreign proceeding by or against the debtor
S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978)(remarks of Sen. Wallop). Four states have enacted such
discriminatory legislation. Chapter 79-363, 1979 Fla. Laws (to be codified as FLA. STAT. §
222.20); Act No. 597, 1979 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1168 (West)(to be codified as LA. REV. STAT.
§ 3881 in (B)); Amended Substitute House Bill No. 674, 1979 Ohio Laws (to be codified as
OHIO REV. CODE § 2329.662); House Bill 1940, 1979 Va. Acts (to be codified as VA. CODE § 34-
3.1). The enactment of such legislation by the state of South Carolina was favored by Lacy,
South Carolina's Statutory Exemptions in Consumer Bankruptcy, 30 S.C. L. REv. 643, 689-
90, 701 (1979).
110 In re Wetteroff, 453 F.2d 544 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Reid v.
Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962), aff'g 198 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Va. 1961); In re Utz,
7 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1934); 4A COLLIER, supra note 45, 70.1718], at 185-86.1 (1975);
Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 267-72
(1974); Note, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by Entireties, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1073
(1941); 61 MIcH. L. REV. 1351 (1963).
" After a tenant by the entirety has filed a voluntary petition, the other tenant may
become an involuntary debtor under § 303. The fact that one spouse's bankruptcy case was
closed before the other's case was commenced was no obstacle to consolidation and adminis-
tration of the entireties property in Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962). See
Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and
Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REV. 1, 128-29 (1975). But cf. Shipman v. Fitzpatrick, 350 Mo.
118, 164 S.W.2d 912 (1942); Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107, 18 S.W.2d 388 (1929) (criti-
cized in 43 HARV. L. REV. 312 (1929).
"z See §§ 109(b), 303(a), & 704.
113 See §§ 109(d), 303(a), 1123, & 1172.
'" Sections 109(b)(1) & (d).
,, See notes 50-58 supra.
' Section 303(a).
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is already pending."7
The exclusion respecting a farmer is in one respect narrower and in
another respect broader under the Code than under the Bankruptcy Act.
Since a farmer had generally been held to qualify under the Bankruptcy
Act if the major part of his income was derived from farming operations,"'8
the Code's requirement that more than 80% of a farmer's gross income be
derived from a farming operation is a new limitation on the scope of the
exclusion."' Since a farmer may now be a partnership or corporation,'20 the
immunity afforded this class of persons under section 303 is broader than
under the Bankruptcy Act, which defined a 'farmer' as an individual'2' and
further excepted a farmer only if the farmer was a 'natural person'.'
2
Notwithstanding the interpretive difficulties presented, the courts pro-
tected farming partnerships as well as the farmer members thereof from
involuntary proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act.'1 To this extent the
new law codifies a result generally reached under the Bankruptcy Act. The
immunizing of farming corporations from involuntary bankruptcy is, how-
ever, new law, since no case afforded any immunity to a corporate farmer
under the Bankruptcy Act.'
24
,, Section 303(k).
"3 The courts have generally required a farmer who has two sources of income to derive
more than half of his gross income from the farming operations. See, e.g., In re Hinrichs, 314
F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1963) (part-time farmer whose principal income came from commis-
sions on sales held not a farmer); 1 COLLER, supra note 45, 1 4.14121-[4] (1974). The
definition of "farmer" in § 1(17) of the Bankruptcy Act specified that the "farmer" is "an
individual personally engaged in farming or tillage of the soil." The definition further ex-
plained, however, that the term "shall include an individual personally engaged in dairy
farming or in the production of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock products in their
unmanufactured state, if the principal part of his income is derived from any one or more of
such operations." It was not clear whether the clause regarding the "principal part of his
income" applied to every farmer or only to one engaged in dairy farming or production of
poultry or livestock or their products.
"I Section 101(17). The Code defines "farming operation" to include "farming, tillage
of the soil, dairy farming, ranching, production or raising of crops, poultry, or livestock, and
production of poultry or livestock products in an unmanufactured state." § 101(18). This
definition is a paraphrase of the definition of "farmer" in § 1(17) of the Bankruptcy Act. The
only new word appearing in the new definition is "ranching." That addition can hardly be
thought to expand the term beyond its ordinary meaning.
' Section 101(30).
12, Section 1(17) of the Bankruptcy Act.
' Section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act.
" H.D. Still's Sons v. American Nat'l Bank, 209 F. 749 (4th Cir. 1913), cert. denied,
232 U.S. 723 (1914). See also In re Palma Bros., 8 F. Supp. 920, 922 (D. Nev. 1934).
3"4 The enlargement of the immunity afforded farmers from involuntary bankruptcy to
include corporations is not justified or explained in the legislative history. As H.R. 8200 first
passed the House, it excluded from the definition of "farmer" any person receiving in excess
of $275,000 gross income from farming operations in the year before the filing of the petition.
The HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 322, [1978] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6278,
explained that the definition of farmer, derived from the Small Business Act, was intended
to encompass small farmers, not agribusinesses. The expansive approach taken in the enacted
definition is to be contrasted with that animating the Review Committee for Article 9 of the
1979]
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Another exclusion from amenability to an involuntary petition is "a
corporation that is not a moneyed, business, or commercial corporation."
This exclusion continues an immunity provided by section 4b of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. 25 The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws had been persuaded
Uniform Commercial Code when it recommended deletion of the special exemption from
notice-filing for purchase-money security interests in farm equipment:
While family farms still exist in this country, farms operating on a subsistence basis
rather than operating as businesses must now be a small part of the total occupation
of farming. Accordingly, the Committee proposes to adopt the theory expressed in
Leavitt, 'A Bank Examiner Looks at Agricultural Lending,' 49 Fed. Res. Bull. 922,
926 (1963), namely, 'Farming has changed from "way of life" to a "way of business"
and farm credit must be treated like business credit.'
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, Preliminary Draft No. 2, p.
15 (1970).
The legislative reports explained that "[flarmers are excepted because of cyclical nature
of their business. One drought year or one year of low prices, as a result of which a farmer is
temporarily unable to pay his creditors, should not subject him to involuntary bankruptcy."
HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 322, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6278; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 62, at 32, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5818. Many kinds of
entrepreneurs that are equally subject to vicissitudes of nature and price fluctuations are not
granted protection from their creditors seeking relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
'2 The expression "moneyed, business, or commercial corporations" made its first ap-
pearance in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, Pub. L. No. 176, § 37, 14 Stat. 517, 535. The
applicability of the law to corporations was limited to those that were "moneyed, business,
or commercial corporations" in order to prevent its use "against religious and educational and
eleemosynary corporations." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 989 (1867). Many interpreta-
tions of the expression made it clear that the definition included railroads, banks, and insur-
ance companies. Samuels, supra note 62, at 50. National banks were not included because
the National Bank Act was held paramount. In re Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank, 16 F. Cas. 665
(N.D. Ill. 1873) (No. 9,051).
All corporations were excluded from voluntary bankruptcy by the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, but only national banks and banks incorporated under state and territorial laws were
explicitly excluded from involuntary bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. No. 591,
§ 4(b), 30 Stat. 544, 547 (1898). Other corporations were made generally amenable to involun-
tary bankruptcy by language in § 4b of the Act subjecting to involuntary adjudication "any
corporation engaged principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, or mercan-
tile pursuits, owing debts to the amount of one thousand dollars or over." Id. After "mining"
was added to the list of pursuits in 1903 by Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 62, § 3, section
4b of the Act was amended in 1910 to repeal the references to various kinds of pursuits and
to subject "any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a municipal, railroad,
insurance, or banking corporation, owing . . . one thousand dollars or over" to involuntary
bankruptcy. Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 294, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839. Although the result
was thought to be more formal than substantive, see H.R. REP. No. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
205-06 (1910), it is clear that a number of new enterprises were brought within the scope of
involuntary proceedings, including, for example, public utilities other than railroads. But see
H. BLACK, BANKRUPTCY 107 (2d ed. 1930) [hereinafter cited as BLACK]. Black doubted that
public service corporations should be held amenable to involuntary bankruptcy because of
"their close connection with the convenience of the public interest in their uninterrupted and
efficient operation." Id. at 107.
Section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act contained two additional limitations on amenability
to involuntary bankruptcy which disappear from the Code. A wage-earner was excluded, but
the definition practically eliminated any beneficiary of this immunity by placing a ceiling of
$1,500 on his annual compensation. Bankruptcy Act § 1(32). The subdivision also included
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to delete the exclusion on an assessment of the considerations set out in a
careful study of this immunity in an article by Dean Sovern.'2 The legisla-
tive reports, by noting that the exclusion protects eleemosynary institu-
tions, including churches, schools, charitable organizations, and founda-
tions,'1' impliedly accept the rationale that it is better for these institu-
tions' creditors to be left to the hazards of grab law than for the institutions
to be subjected to liquidation or reorganization under the bankruptcy laws,
unless and until the institutions' managers opt for relief under Title 11.
The protection of such a corporation from an involuntary reorganization
under Chapter 11 is perhaps more easily justified, or at least more easily
understood, than immunity from involuntary liquidation. However, if a
reorganization plan could be formulated that meets all the standards re-
quired for confirmation by section 1129,12 no readily apparent public pol-
icy or interest would be trammeled.
2
Since the classification of a corporation as "moneyed, business, or com-
mercial" for the purposes of section 303(a) implements or vindicates no
state policy,'30 there is no reason to consult state law in determining
whether a particular corporation is amenable to involuntary administra-
tion under the bankruptcy laws. Whatever policy considerations underlie
the limitation imposed by the phrase,'3' the phrase should be given a
an ambiguous limitation applicable to a debtor owing debts in the amount of $1,000 or more.
It was not clear from the statutory language whether the limitation required every person
against whom an involuntary petition was filed to owe $1,000, or whether it applied only to a
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation. Conceivably, the limitation operated to re-
strict the number of corporations immunized from involuntary bankruptcy. The Commission
recommended deletion of the immunity for a wage-earner as meaningless and elimination of
any differentiation of corporations based on the amount of their indebtedness or their charac-
ter as moneyed, business, or commercial. COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 15. Section
303(a) of the Bankruptcy Code preserves the latter distinction, but the other two recommen-
dations of the Commission were followed.
'' Sovern, supra note 54, at 231-43 (1957).
,2 HoUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 322, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 6228;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 32, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 5818.
"I The owners and managers of a corporation that is not moneyed, business, or commer-
cial cannot be compelled to continue the activities of the corporation against their will. This
potential problem, however, is presented by any involuntary petition seeking relief under
Chapter 11. Unwilling management should be displaced by a disinterested trustee if an
involuntary case under Chapter 11 is commenced by a petition that is sufficient in all respects
under section 303 and the interests of creditors and the debtor, as distinguished from the
owners and the managers, are better served by a continuation rather than a dismissal of the
case.
1' Cf. Sovern, supra note 54, at 239.
'" As Dean Sovern noted, states do not usually have any classification of a corporation
as moneyed, business, or commercial. Id. at 231.
"I, Dean Sovern surmised that:
Congress adopted this involuntary bankruptcy exclusion in 1910 . . . because it
thought that corporations which were unconcerned with money, business or com-
merce should not have' their laudable activities disrupted by liquidation at the
instance of pestiferous creditors. Perhaps, too, the members of Congress felt that a
remedy once thought of as the special province of blackguards, and occasionally
19791 1001
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uniform construction across the country. Although "moneyed" originally
had reference to banking and other financial corporations,'32 the three
words, "moneyed," "business," and "commercial" have generally not been
distinguished in the construction of the language of section 4b of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. '3  The words generally have been held not to afford immunity
to all "nonprofit" corporations,14 particularly cooperatives organized to
market produce.
35
There has been no doubt about the Congressional purpose in the Bank-
ruptcy Act to exclude religious, educational, and charitable or eleemosy-
nary corporations from involuntary bankruptcy, 3 ' and the Bankruptcy
Code plainly extends the immunity of these organizations. There is less
certainty about fraternal and social organizations,3 7 and there have been
divergent rulings in cases involving organizations that have engaged in
money-making activities for the purpose of financing their noncommercial
purposes. '3 Congress did not manifest any intent in the Bankruptcy Code
to extend or to expand the scope of the immunity covering corporations
that are not moneyed, business, or commerical.
As noted above, 39 a foreign bank that is eligible for relief as a voluntary
debtor under Title 11 is nevertheless afforded a double immunity by sec-
tion 303(k): (1) Such a bank cannot be subjected to an involuntary reorg-
still so regarded, ought not to be inflicted on such highminded enterprises. In short,
Congress' purpose was ... to give those corporations a dispensation from an un-
pleasant law designed for the self-seeking world of commerce and business.
Id. at 232.
02 See generally BLACK, supra note 125.
13 Id.
"' See, e.g., Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1950)
(cooperative society formed under state statutes governing "benevolent corporations" for
rehabilitation and relief of needy farm families nevertheless held to be subject to involuntary
bankruptcy). But cf. Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943) (mutual benefit
society held not a moneyed, business or commercial corporation because not organized for
profit). The Missco case appears not to be overruled by §§ 109(b)(2) and 303(a). See text
accompanying notes 56 & 115 supra.
,3 See, e.g., In re Wisconsin Coop. Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 655 (1941); Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Coop. Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932); In
re South Shore Coop. Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1933).
136 See Sovern, supra note 54, at 233.
237 Compare In re William McKinley Lodge, 4 F. Supp. 280, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (Ma-
sonic lodge held subject to involuntary bankruptcy because of income received from renting
lodge rooms to the general public) with In re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238, 241 (S.D.
N.Y. 1931) (corporation formed to operate a golf course for the pleasure of its members held
not to be subject to voluntary bankruptcy). Such corporations are not within the categories
of "churches, schools, and charitable organizations," to which the legislative history refers.
HoUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 332, [1978] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6278.
'1' Compare In re William McKinley Lodge, 4 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) with In re
Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1937), appeal
dismissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1938) (payments to hospital for services rendered to patients
able to pay held not to subject the hospital to involuntary bankruptcy, since such payments
simply enabled the hospital to carry out charitable activities).
239 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
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anization petition and (2) an involuntary petition for liquidation can be
filed only if a foreign proceeding concerning the debtor is pending. The
latter immunity was recommended by the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence in recognition of the potentially dire consequences for the foreign
bank in its own country that may be triggered by an involuntary petition
in this country.'40 With respect to the first immunity, no objection is likely
to be raised against a bar imposed on an involuntary petition for reorgani-
zation of a foreign bank. A legitimate inquiry, however, is why either of
these immunities should be restricted to an involuntary case against a
foreign bank. Since section 109(b) quite pointedly and probably unneces-
sarily excludes from the benefits and burdens of the Bankruptcy Code both
domestic and foreign savings and cooperative banks when they are doing
business in the United States, the reference in section 303(k) to only a
foreign bank must mean that -no special immunity against any variety of
involuntary petition under Title 11 attaches to any of the eligible foreign
financial institutions other than a "plain and ordinary" foreign bank or to
any foreign insurance company. The narrowness of section 303(k) has been
criticized,' 4' but the burden of justifying additional or broader immunities
is on the proponent. The risk of a run on any foreign financial institution
other than a conventional bank or on an insurance company, with the
irreversible consequences that attend a bank run, are not likely to be
triggered by an involuntary petition in this country. In any event, the Code
contains ample authority for the bankruptcy court to dismiss or suspend
a case filed against a foreign debtor of any kind when the interests of the
debtor and the creditors would be better served.
42
1,' See Hearings, supra note 13, Appendix, Ser. No. 27, at 350-51. See also HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 17, at 324, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6280; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 62, at 35, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5818. The REPORT ON INSURANCE
COMPANIES, supra note 61, at 27-29, pointed out that the dependence of banks upon liabilities
withdrawable on demand or on short notice makes it imperative to avoid situations which
undermine banks' ability to attract funds. The hazard pointed out by the Committee was
aggravated under the version of the Bankrupcty Act proposed by the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws by the fact that a single petitioner could file an involuntary petition. COMMISSION
REPORT 11, supra note 9, § 4-205(a), at 74.
A confusing statement in the House and Senate Reports declared that "[a i n involuntary
case commenced under this subsection [k] gives the foreign representative an alternative to
commencing a case ancillary to a foreign proceeding under section 304." HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 17, at 324, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6280; SENATE REPORT, supra note
62, at 35, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5818. Sections 301 and 303 give the foreign
representative several alternatives to proceeding under section 304, but subsection 303(k)
creates no alternative; it limits what would otherwise be available under other subsections
of section 303.
' Samuels, supra note 62, at 92; cf. Howard, United States Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
Over Unregulated Foreign Banks, 17 HAW. INT'L L. REv. 359,394 (1976) (criticizing the section
for disabling creditors of a foreign bank to obtain bankruptcy relief when it would be equitable
to grant it).
22 Section 305; see text accompanying notes 227-34 infra. Although § 305 requires notice
and hearing, it is unlikely that the limitation imposed by § 303(k) on the filing of a petition
against a foreign bank will be deemed self-enforcing. It may be easier to establish a right to
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2. Qualifications of Petitioning Creditors
Section 303(b) prescribes the qualifications for petitioners in most in-
voluntary cases. Paragraph (1), requiring three or more petitioners' hold-
ing unsecured claims of $5,000 or more, is the usually applicable provi-
sion.' The claims must not be contingent, but there is no requirement in
the statute that they be liquidated.'45 The petitioning creditors'46 may be
recover damages for bad faith in filing a petition in violation of § 303(k) than 6ne dismissible
under § 305, but that seems an insufficient reason for broadening § 303(k).
"I The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recommended that one petitioner with a claim
of at least $10,000 in a reorganization case be permitted to file an involuntary petition.
COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, § 4-205. The Commission's recommendation was consis-
tent with its purpose to facilitate involuntary proceedings against a debtor destined for relief
under the bankruptcy laws and generally consistent with bankruptcy laws in other countries
in according the right to file a petition in bankruptcy to a single petitioner. See COMMISSION
REPORT I, supra note 1, at 225 n. 44; Hearings, supra note 13, at 1445 (statement of Professor
Kurt H. Nadelmann); EUROPEAN BANKRUPTCY LAws at 57, 70, 77, 92, 123, 142 (I. Ross ed. 1974)
(discussing the laws of Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, and Sweden).
The notion that a single petitioner should have the option to precipitate involuntary
proceedings under the bankruptcy laws was generally opposed by critics in hearings on the
Commission's and Bankruptcy Judges' bills. These critics thought it would tend to jeopardize
a privately negotiated settlement outside bankruptcy, encourage a demand for a preference
as a price for not filing an involuntary petition, and facilitate the design of a competitor to
acquire a business rival by filing an involuntary petition against him. See Hearings, supra
note 13, at 325 (testimony of Daniel Cowans, former bankruptcy judge from California); 976
(testimony of Bernard Shapiro for the National Bankruptcy Conference); 1604-05, and 1631
(statement and testimony of John J. Creedon for the American Life Insurance Ass'n); 1657,
1663 (statement and testimony of L.E. Creel III for the Dallas Bar Ass'n); 1670, 1672, 1678
(statement of of K. Richard Kaufman for Credit Managers Ass'n of Southern California);
1748, 1757 (statement and testimony of Robert J. Grimmig for American Bankers Ass'n); 1870
(statement of American Ass'n of Equipment Lessors); Appendix, Ser. No. 27, at 351 (draft
of proposed amendments by National Bankruptcy Conference).
"I The minimum amount required to be held by petitioning creditors has been increased
from $500 in straight bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act (§ 59b) to the amount heretofore
required of petitioning creditors in corporate reorganization under Chapter X (§ 126). See §
303(b)(1). The minimum amount is made uniform "in order that there not be an artificial
difference between the two chapters [i.e., Chapters 7 and 11]." HousE REPORT, supra note
17, at 322, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6278. Petitioners in railroad reorganiza-
tion cases have been required by § 77(a) of the Bankruptcy Act to have claims aggregating
not less than 5% of all the indebtedness of the railroad corporation. As under Chapter X (§
126), but not in straight bankruptcy or railroad reorganization under the Bankruptcy Act,
an indenture trustee representing the holder of a qualified claim may be a petitioner on an
involuntary petition. § 303(b)(1).
"I Query, whether Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure may require, as does § 59b of the
Bankruptcy Act, that the claims of petitioners be amenable to liquidation without unreasona-
bly delaying the administration of the estate? Rules 104 and 10-105 of the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure, which have governed involuntary petitions, include no reference to the
nature of the claims of petitioning creditors.
The disqualification of a petitioning creditor for participation in the act of bankruptcy
alleged, imposed by Rule 104(b), is no longer applicable by virtue of the abolition of acts of
bankruptcy. See text accompanying notes 165-85 infra.
"' While § 303(b) does not identify "creditors" as qualified petitioners, the reference in
the text to "petitioning creditors" is accurate and appropriate. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of
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partially secured, so long as the petitioners' aggregated unsecured claims
amount to at least $5,000.
Paragraph (2) of section 303(b) preserves the rule of the Bankruptcy
Act requiring only one petitioner if there are fewer than twelve creditors
of the debtor.'47 In computing the number of creditors, employees, insiders,
and transferees of voidable transfers are excluded. "' An insider is defined
in section 101(25) and includes any of 18 categories of persons. The exclu-
sions are comparable to those provided by section 59e of the Bankruptcy
Act. 4 9
Rules 104(d) and 10-105(b) disqualify any person from acting as peti-
tioner who transferred or acquired a claim for the purpose of commencing
a case. Whether this disqualification remains effective depends on the
answer to a question that must be frequently considered and answered by
the draftsmen of the rules under section 2075: Is the Code's omission of a
procedural limitation embodied in the Rules inconsistent with its continu-
ing applicability? 0 The guidelines distributed by the Co-reporters for the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules assumes that such a limitation
may still be imposed and applied.' While the Code's silence may imply a
negation of particular Rules of Procedure, the drawing of a general and
automatic implication of negation from silence would tend to restrict un-
duly the ability of the Supreme Court to enforce procedural safeguards
found necessary or desirable in the light of experience.
section 303(b) actually authorize only an entity that is a holder of a claim against the debtor
to file or join in filing an involuntary case. A "claim" is defined in § 101(4) to include a right
to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance even though the
breach does not give rise to a right of payment. A "creditor" is defined in § 101(9) as an entity
having a claim against the debtor or the estate.
"I Section 303(b)(2). The sole petitioner under the Code, however, must have an unse-
cured, noncontingent claim of at least $5000, ten times the minimum required by § 59b of
the Bankruptcy Act.
,,I Transfers such as statutory liens, preferences, fraudulent transfers, postpetition trans-
fers, and liens securing fines, penalties, and multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages are
those voidable by the trustee as a hypothetical creditor or purchaser or as a successor to an
actual creditor of the estate. It is conceivable but unlikely that a petitioning creditor may be
disqualified on account of having received a postpetition transfer.
"' One ground of exclusion no longer recognized is that involving creditors who have
participated in the act of bankruptcy charged in the petition. But see R. BANKR. P. 104(b).
Since there is no longer any act of bankruptcy, this ground of exclusion is no longer appropri-
ate.
'w The question whether the Code's failure to mention a procedural limitation of the
Rules nullifies such a limitation assumes that Rules 104(d) and 10-105(b) are procedural and
thus fall within the ambit of the rule-making power granted by Congress. As pointed out in
the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 104(d), the latter provision was derived from General
Order 5(2), which had originally been promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
narrow authority to prescribe intersitial rules and forms of procedure. Neither General Order
5(2) nor the Rule of Procedure disqualifying transferors and transferees of claims from acting
as petitioners have been challenged as in excess of the Court's rule-making power.
"' See Interim Rule 1003(b), derived from R. BANKR. P. 104(d) and 10-104(d).
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3. Partnership Cases
Paragraph (3) of section 303(b)(3) contains additional options for the
commencement of an involuntary case against a partnership. These provi-
sions are in no way a limitation on the availability of voluntary relief on a
petition against the partnership by creditors under paragraphs (1) and (2)
of section 303(b). Furthermore, the additional options provided by section
303(b)(3) are derived from prior bankruptcy law.'52
The first option provided by section 303(b)(3) has sometimes been re-
ferred to as the hybrid petition in that it authorizes a petition to be filed
against a partnership by one or more but fewer than all of the general
partners. This option has been called hybrid because it is voluntary so far
as the petitioning partner is concerned but involuntary with respect to the
other partners. Unlike a creditors' petition, the hybrid petition under the
Bankruptcy Act did not need to allege the commission of an act of bank-
ruptcy and thus sufficed if it alleged the insolvency of the partnership.'53
An act of bankruptcy is not required to be alleged in any involuntary
petition under the Code, but the allegations and proof required for a hybrid
petition under the new law are the same as required for a creditors' peti-
tion.'54
A second option for a partnership debtor is available when relief has
been ordered with respect to all of the general partners in a partnership.
In such a case a general partner, the trustee of a general partner, or a
creditor of the partnership may file a petition to seek relief.'55 While this
provision is comparable to an option provided in section 5i of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, supplemented and implemented by Rule 105(d) of the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, the new law differs in that it requires a peti-
tioner to allege and prove the same grounds for requesting relief as are
imposed on any other petitioner. When all the general partners have been
adjudged bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Act and the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure have required no allegation and no showing other than the part-
ners adjudications in order to obtain an adjudication of the partnership.
4. Cases Against Debtors in Foreign Proceedings
A fourth kind of involuntary case is one that may be commenced by a
foreign representative of an estate that is undergoing administration in a
,12 Section 303(b)(A) is derived from the first sentence and the proviso of § 5b of the
Bankruptcy Act. Section 303(b)(3)(B) is derived from the first sentence of § 5i of the Act.
11 Bankruptcy Act § 5b (proviso). Since a partnership cannot be insolvent if any partner
is solvent, this provision did not enable a solvent member of a failing firm to put the partner-
ship into bankruptcy. 1A COLLIER, supra note 45, at 704 (1978).
"I Since insolvency need not be alleged or established under § 303 of the new law, a
solvent partner of such a firm may precipitate any involuntary case concerning the partner-
ship under the new law. The partner must nevertheless allege and, if the petition is contested,
show the elements specified in 303(h).
' Section 303(b)(3)(B).
THE NEW BANKRUPTCY CODE
foreign proceeding.'58 The standing accorded a foreign representative by
section 303(b)(4) in no way diminishes the eligibility of a debtor in a
foreign proceeding to file a voluntary petition under section 301, or the
debtor's amenability to an involuntary petition filed by creditors or other
parties in interest under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 303(b).' 57 The
availability of relief to other petitioners under the Bankruptcy Code is no
reason for withholding relief from the foreign representative, who is the
logical party in interest to seek such relief if it is needed or appropriate.'5 8
As previously noted,' 5 there is a special limitation on the availability of
an involuntary petition against a foreign bank not engaged in doing busi-
'" Section 303(b)(4). A "foreign proceeding" is defined as a:
proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not under bank-
ruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal
place of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such
proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composti-
tion, extension, or discharge, or effecting a reorganization. § 101(19).
A "foreign representative" is defined in § 101(20) as a "duly selected trustee, administrator,
or other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding."
"I The debtor in a foreign proceeding is eligible to file a voluntary petition if he can
satisfy the requisites of § 109(a) by having a domicile, place of business, or property in the
United States. These requisites also apply to a petition filed against such a debtor under §
303, including one filed by a foreign representative under § 303(b)(4). A petition filed concern-
ing a debtor in a foreign proceeding under § 301, 302, or 303, including 303(b)(4), contem-
plates administration of the debtor's estate in the same manner as any other estate that is
administered under Title 11, but there are special provisions that may apply to such a case.
Thus § 305(a)(2) recognizes that suspension or dismissal may be particularly appropriate in
such a case. Section 508(a) provides a special rule for effecting equality of distribution when
a debtor's estate is being administered in a foreign proceeding as well as under Title 11.
Section 304, discussed in the text accompanying notes 214-26 infra, provides for certain
ancillary relief on a petition filed by a foreign representative, but such relief is less than or
at least different from that obtainable under §§ 301-303.
'18 See Hearings, supra note 13, at 1510, 1516 (statement of Professor Stefan A. Riesen-
feld); Stevens, The Interpenetration of Foreign Bankruptcy Laws in Domestic Proceedings
Under H.R. 8200, 52 Am. BANKR. L.J. 61, 66-67, 75 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Stevens]. But
see Hearings, supra note 13, at 1443, 1449, 1451, 1508 (statement and testimony of Professor
Kurt H. Nadelmann).
If § 303(b)(4) had been in effect, the German liquidator of the Herstatt Bank could have
filed a timely petition to obtain an avoidance of liens of attaching creditors against funds of
the bank held in New York. See Stevens, supra, at 64. See also note 221 infra. While that
option might have been available to the liquidator under the Bankruptcy Act, there was no
explicit recognition of his standing in the Act. Moreover, there was doubt as to the amenabil-
ity to bankruptcy of the bank, a Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien, which in some respects
is like a partnership and in some respects like a corporation. Finally the liquidator was
uncertain as to his vulnerability to litigaton and binding adverse judgments in American
courts. See note 225 infra; see also Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy
Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Nadelmann]. Under the circumstances the attaching creditors were able to obtain
an advantageous settlement and dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy petition filed against
the Bank. Becker, International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 62 A.B.A.J. 1290, 1294-95
(1976); Samuels, supra note 62, at 91 n. 180; cf. Nadelmann, supra at 9-10.
'" See text accompanying notes 139-42 supra.
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ness in the United States, because such a case may be commenced only if
a foreign proceeding concerning the bank is pending in another country.'60
5. Grounds for Involuntary Relief
The most noteworthy change accomplished by the Bankruptcy Code
within the scope of this article is the abolition of the acts of bankruptcy.
This is a reform called for over forty years ago6' and vigorously supported
by Professor James MacLachlan in his hornbook on bankruptcy published
over twenty years ago.' The National Bankruptcy Conference was per-
suaded by Professor MacLachlan's argument of the soundness of this re-
form, '3 but the Conference did not concur in his belief that the reform
should be coupled with a substantial stiffening of other requirements pre-
scribed for the filing of an involuntary petition. 4 Consistently with its
view that involuntary petitions ought to be easier to file and to sustain
against contesting debtors, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws recom-
mended elimination of the concept of acts of bankruptcy along with reduc-
tion of the required number of petitioners to one.6 5 Although Congress
rejected the latter recommendation, it adopted the former.66
The Code does not particularize what shall be contained in an involun-
tary petition. Subsection (h) of section 303 provides that if the petition is
not controverted timely, the court shall order relief against the debtor in
an involuntary case. While the statute does not particularize the elements
160 Section 303(k).
16 Treiman, Acts of Bankruptcy: A Medieval Concept in Modem Bankruptcy Law, 52
HARV. L. REv. 189 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Treiman].
112 J. MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 56-64 (1956) [hereinafter cited as MAcLACHLAN]. See
also Herzog, Bankruptcy Tomorrow, 45 AM. BANKR. L. J. 57, 59 (1971); Seligson, Major
Problems for Consideration by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
45 Am. BANKR. L. J. 73, 98-100 (1971); Note, "Acts of Bankruptcy" in Perspective, 67 Harv.
L. Rev. 503 (1954).
I National Bankruptcy Conference, Summary of Proceedings of the 1957 Annual Meet-
ing, Res. No. 46, and Summary of Proceedings of the 1958 Annual Meeting, Res. No. 30.
"6I The Conference disagreed with Professor MacLachlan's insistence on requiring a sub-
stantial percentage of the debtor's creditors to join in an involuntary petition. See
MAcLACHLAN, supra note 162, § 71. The result of the Conference debate on the appropriate
number of petitioning creditors was withdrawal by the Conference in favor of its previously
adopted resolutions favoring abolition of acts of bankruptcy. Summary of Proceedings of the
1958 Ann. Meeting, Res. No. 30.
265 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
266 Section 303(h). It has been argued that acts of bankruptcy were not abolished by the
Code, since the second statutory ground for involuntary petition, see text accompanying notes
175-77 infra, includes an event that would have constituted the fourth act of bankruptcy and
an event that comes close to the fifth act of bankruptcy. The term "act of bankruptcy" has
nevertheless disappeared from the Bankruptcy Code, and the objectionable features of the
concept have been eliminated. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 323, [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6280 ("The second test . . . is not a partial reenactment of acts of
bankruptcy"); SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 34, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5820.
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of a prima facie case, subsection (h) requires the court to order relief
against the debtor in an involuntary case only after trial if the petition is
contested. The entry of an order for relief against the debtor in an involun-
tary case is authorized only if (1) the debtor is generally not paying its
debts as they become due, or (2) within 120 days before the filing of the
petition, a custodian has been appointed or authorized to take charge of
substantially all of the property of the debtor.
The first alternative of subsection (h) is derived from the Commission's
recommendation that a general failure to pay debts as they become due
should be a ground for relief on an involuntary petition.117 As an alternative
ground for relief the Commission had also recommended that "the debtor
will be generally unable to pay his current liabilities as they become
due."'68 Originally this alternative was favored by the House Judiciary
Committee and included in the version of H.R. 8200 first passed by the
House.'69 The Senate bill, S. 2266, had prescribed as the first ground for
involuntary relief that "the debtor is generally unable to pay or has failed
to pay a major portion of his debts as such debts became due." In opting
for general nonpayment of debts as they become due rather than on inabil-
ity to pay them, Congress seems to have rejected the traditional formula-
tion of the equity definition of insolvency as a ground for involuntary
administration.Y0 Inability to pay is thus no defense to a petition under
267 COMMISSION REPORT Il, supra note 9, § 4-205(c)(2).
' Id. § 4-205(c)(1).
"' The House Report accompanying H.R. 8200 pointed out that the first ground in §
303(h) adopted the equity insolvency test which "has been in equity jurisprudence for
hundreds of years, and though it is new in the bankruptcy context (except in Chapter X),
the bankruptcy courts should have no difficulty in applying it." HousE REPORT, supra note
17, at 323, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6280. The Report understated the extent
to which the equity insolvency test has been relevant in bankruptcy. The insolvency test has
been an alternative requirement when the fifth act of bankruptcy has been relied on by
petitioning creditors seeking involuntary adjudication. Bankruptcy Act § 3a(5). A voluntary
petition filed under §§ 77(a), 84, 130(1), 323, 423, or 623 had to allege that the debtor was
insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature. Likewise an involuntary petition under
§ 77a or 130(1) was required to allege insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature.
Professor James MacLachlan recommended that any debtor otherwise amenable to
bankruptcy should be subject to an adjudication as bankrupt if he is in fact unable to pay
his debts as they mature. MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 162, at 63-64, 436. Professor MacLachlan
suggested that the ultimate fact of such inability should be conclusively evidenced by proof
that "the debtor has failed to pay or secure the payment of a final judgment rendered against
him at least one month and not exceeding five months before the petition." Prima facie
evidence of such inability would be that within four months before the petition, the debtor
has stopped making payments in the due course of business. Id. at 436.
170 See note 169 supra. The managers of the final version of H.R. 8200 that reconciled
the differences with S.2266 simply observed that § 303(h)(1) was a compromise of the stan-
dards found in the House and Senate versions. Congressional Record, supra note 29, at
H11091 and S17407. It was suggested in the SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 34, [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws at 5820, that the test of failure to pay a major portion of his debts
as they become due was a variation of the equity insolvency test.
U.C.C. § 1-201(23) defines an "insolvent" person as one "who either has ceased to pay
his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is
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section 303(h) (1) if the debtor is avoiding or generally neglecting payment
of his debts. The Code focuses on the debtor's behavior in respect to his
debts rather than his financial condition and has thereby eliminated the
need for and the relevance of an inquiry into the latter when an involuntary
petition is contested."'
The Commission acknowledged that the scope and meaning of
"generally failed" must be left to the courts. The Commission felt that the
courts must find "more than a past failure to pay only a few of his
debts," and that the court must "consider both number and amount" of
debts in determining whether a failure is general.7 2 The legislative reports
accompanying S. 2266 and the Code as enacted do not elaborate on what
may constitute proof of the existence of this first ground, but Congress did
not require a showing that the debtor has failed to pay a major portion of
his debts.1 3 With respect to the second ground for an involuntary petition,
insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." The Official Comment adds
nothing by way of explanation of this definition except to say that the three tests of insolvency
are alternatives "and must be approached from a commercial standpoint." The definition is
not discussed in any of the literature generated by the Code.
It was held in In re Creative Buildings, Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th Cir. 1974), that return
of two checks, one for $47,859.23 and another for $9,900.76, for insufficient funds did not
require a finding that the drawer was insolvent within the meaning of U.C.C. § 1-201(23).
The first check was paid when re-presented. The court acknowledged that "[t]he issuance
of the NSF checks may indicate an impecunious status and be notice that the drawer may
be insolvent." The question of insolvency arose in the case when the payee of the check,
invoking U.C.C. § 2-702, sought to reclaim goods shipped to the drawer.
,", The concept of the acts of bankruptcy was criticized because the concept ignored the
debtor's financial condition at the date of filing the petition. The statutory focus of §
303(h)(1) is on what the debtor is doing in respect to his debts at the very moment of the
filing of the petition. If, as Professor MacLachlan suggested, MAcLAcHLAN, supra note 162,
at 436, nonpayment of indebtedness is evidence of inability to pay debts, the Code's reliance
on general nonpayment of debts as they mature is a way of establishing the debtor's current
financial condition without requiring the creditors to engage in discovery of evidence to prove
insolvency. Whatever the difficulties posed by the vagueness of "generally not paying" debts
as they become due, the scope and nature of the factual inquiry entailed by the new test
should be less burdensome on both the petitioners and the debtor. Rule 114 authorizing
examination of the bankrupt in respect to insolvency or inability to pay debts as they mature,
is no longer applicable, but discovery procedures available under Rule 205 should remain
available to petitioning creditors. In addition, the Co-reporters for the Advisory Committee
on Bankruptcy Rules have suggested an adaptation of Rule 114 as a new Rule 1008. The
suggested rule requires the debtor to appear with his books, papers, and accounts to submit
to an examination if he denies an allegation of an involuntary petition that he is generally
not paying his debts as they become due.
172 COMMISSION REPORT H, supra note 9, at 75.
'1 Pointing out that "[f]rom the creditor's standpoint, the word 'generally' could be
troublesome," John J. Creedon for the American Life Insurance Association recommended
that either a general failure or a failure to pay a major portion of his debts be a ground for
an involuntary petition. Hearings, supra note 13, at 1605. Mr. Creedon suggested that al-
though the debtor might be in default to two or three creditors holding 90% of a debtor's
indebtedness, the debtor's nondelinquency in respect to a thousand other small creditors
holding small claims might insulate him from involuntary proceedings. Inferably Congress
concluded that a debtor in such a situation would be unlikely to prevail on a contest of an
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namely, that a custodian has been appointed to take charge of the property
of the debtor, the word "custodian" is defined in section 101(10) to mean
a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of the
debtor's property, or an assignee under general assignment for the benefit
of creditors. The receiver or trustee must be one that is either appointed
in a case or proceedings instituted under some law other than Title 11 74
or one that has been appointed or authorized to take charge of the property
for the purpose of enforcing a lien or for the purpose of effecting general
involuntary petition and that the statutory language already covered a situation such as that
suggested by Mr. Creedon.
Experience under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act may be instructive. Since 1922 when it
was introduced into the Canadian law, 12-13 Geo. V, c.8, § 3, the act of bankruptcy most
frequently used by petitioning creditors is that the debtor "ceases to meet his liabilities
generally as they become due". A few cases have ordered administration on the basis of a
showing of aggravated failure to pay a single indebtedness. In re Raynor, [1935] 2 D.L.R.
542 (P.E.I.); cf. In re Canadian Cap Co., 53 Ont. L. Rep. 506 (App. Div. 1922) (default in
payment of series of notes due one creditor held sufficient when statute did not require general
cessation of payments). Generally, however, proof of nonpayment of a single debt has been
held insufficient support for a petition grounded upon an allegation of general cessation of
payments. See, e.g., In re Holmes and Sinclair, 20 Can. Bankr. Ann. (n.s.) 111 (Ont. Sup.
Ct. 1975); In re Tetrault & Freres Limitee, 28 Can. Bankr. Ann. 28 (Quebec 1946). Proof of
nonpayment of several debts of substantial size i disregard of creditors' demands and
debtor's promises to pay on the eve of the filing of the petition has frequently been upheld as
a sufficient basis for an order of administration. In re Shirley, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 969 (nonpay-
ment of 16 accounts totaling $3733.30 held to be an act of bankruptcy notwithstanding
payment in full of 40 accounts and partial payments on 21 accounts); In re Glenn, 23 Can.
Bankr. Ann. 81 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1941); In re Shellbrook Store, 13 Can. Bankr. Ann. 24 (Sask.
1931); In re Campbell, [1947] Ont. Wkly. Notes 675 (High Ct. of Justice in Bankruptcy
1947).
Since the Canadian law requires an act of bankruptcy to have been committed within
six months of the filing of the petition, the question arises whether a continuing failure to
pay debts that commenced before the six-month period may suffice as a basis for an involun-
tary petition. "Stale defaults" antedating the six-month period have not been treated as a
cessation occudring within the period. In re England & Son, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 738 (C.A.); In
re Vipond and Ewing, 70 Que. K.B. 41 (1941). Failure to respond to demands made for
payment of old indebtedness within the six-month period has, on the other hand, been held
a sufficient act of bankruptcy. In re Raitblat, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 219 (Ont. Sup. Ct.), affl'd,
[1925] 3 D.L.R. 446 (C.A.).
I am indebted to John D. Honsberger, Q.C., of the Toronto Bar for the references to the
Canadian cases cited in this note.
114 If a receiver or trustee is appointed in any nonbankruptcy litigation ("a case or
proceeding not under this title"), the purpose of the appointment is relevant only in a custodi-
anship involving less than substantially all of the debtor's property. If the purpose in such a
case is lien enforcement, the custodianship is not ground for an involuntary petition. A
receivership obtained in a proceeding supplementary to execution on a judgment or a receiv-
ership to conserve assets during the pendency of a statutory proceeding is, on the other hand,
a ground for involuntary relief under § 303(h)(2), irrespective of the amount or proportion of
the property taken in charge by the receiver. Possibilities for harsh application of § 303(h)(2)
are intended to be kept within bounds by § 305(a), which authorizes dismissal if "the interest
of creditors and the debtor would be better served" thereby, and by § 303(i), which imposes
liability on petitioners in the event of a dismissal. See the discussion of these safeguards in
the text accompanying notes 199-204 & 227-34 infra.
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administration for the benefit of creditors. An agent is also a custodian if
appointed to enforce a lien or to effect general administration. If the pur-
pose of the custodianship is the enforcement of a lien, however, the cus-
todian must have been appointed or authorized to take charge of substan-
tially all of the debtor's property in order to furnish a ground for involun-
tary relief under Title 11. A custodian need not be appointed by a court
and need not be vested with title or subject to any fiduciary obligations
respecting the property in his custody.
The alternative of a custodianship dating from a time within 120 days
of the filing of the petition comes close to continuing the fourth and fifth
acts of bankruptcy. Thus the case law applying section 3a(4) and, to a
lesser extent, section 3a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act will be relevant in
construing the definition of "custodian" and applying section 303(h)(2).'11
When a custodian of the kind referred to in section 303(h)(2) is appointed
or authorized to take charge, however, neither insolvency nor inability to
pay debts as they mature need be shown, as has been necessary under
section 3a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. Under the Bankruptcy Act the ap-
pointment of a receiver in a lien foreclosure proceeding has not been re-
garded as an act of bankruptcy. 76 Thus, predicating an involuntary liqui-
dation on a custodianship of substantially all of the property in a mortgage
and lien foreclosure proceeding is a departure from old law. On the other
hand, such a custodianship did constitute a ground for the filing of an
involuntary petition for reorganization under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act, but there was no 120-day limit for such a petition.
7
The significance of the time limitation on the utility of the second
ground of an involuntary petition under section 303(h) is considerably
diminished by the continuing availability as a ground, without time limi-
tation, of the general nonpayment of debts as they become due.'," The duty
of a custodian to turn over and account to the trustee for property of the
estate is not subject to any limitation pegged to the time when the petition
is filed. 78 Thus, a custodianship is treated in both liquidation and reorgan-
'I See 1 COLLIER, supra note 45, at 3.402-3.406, & 3.502-3.505 (1974).
,71 MAcLACHLAN, supra note 162, at 48.
177 Bankruptcy Act § 131(2), & (3). In some respects the Bankruptcy Code provisions
permitting an involuntary petition to be filed on the ground of the appointment or authoriza-
tion of a custodian to take charge of the property of the debtor are broader than § 131 of the
Bankruptcy Act. A custodianship in other than a lien enforcement proceeding need not
involve substantially all of the debtor's property under §§ 101(10) and § 303(h)(2) of the Code
as was required under § 131(2) of the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, an agent who is neither a
trustee nor a receiver may qualify as a custodian under the Code provisions if appointed or
authorized by contract or other applicable law, but § 131 of the Bankruptcy Act does not
recognize such a person. On the other hand, possession of a debtor's property by an indenture
trustee or mortgagee was a ground for filing an involuntary petition under Chapter X (§
131(3)) but is not a ground under § 303(h) of the Code.
I'8 Cf. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 324, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6280; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 34, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5820.
7I Section 543. An assignee for the benefit of creditors appointed or taking possession
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izations under the Code in much the same way as it was in Chapter X
reorganization cases.
One of the criticisms of the concept of acts of bankruptcy was that it
focused on an event that might have predated the filing of a petition by
several months and that might be unrelated to the condition of the debtor
at the filing of the petition seeking relief.8 ' On the other hand, the four-
month period was so short that it sometimes led to the filing of a petition
before an adequate investigation could be made to determine whether all
the elements of an act of bankruptcy had been committed, lest the allowa-
ble period expire."'1 A more serious objection to the acts of bankruptcy,
however, was the heavy burden of proving their commission.18 Most acts
of bankruptcy required proof of insolvency, in the bankruptcy or equity
sense, at some point in the last four months preceding a filing of the
petition.'83 The Commission noted several problems in proving acts of
bankruptcy.'84 The difficulties of proving the commission of an act of bank-
ruptcy and the risk of damages for failure of proof deterred or delayed the
filing of petitions that ought to have been filed earlier in order to prevent
the deterioration of the financial condition of the debtor and the loss or
disappearance of assets which further reduced the value of the estate.
1
5
more than 120 days before the filing of the petition may not, however, be surcharged for any
improper or excessive disbursement under § 543(c)(3).
Ma See generally Treiman, supra note 161.
- See e.g, Dworsky v. Alanjay Bias Binding Corp., 182 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1950) (dismiss-
ing involuntary petition predicated on commission of second act of bankruptcy without suffi-
cient allegations of facts); Rawlins v. Hall-Epps Clothing Co., 217 F. 884 (5th Cir. 1914)
(denying application for examination to develop information regarding insolvency and com-
mission of action of bankruptcy by alleged bankrupt).
" COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 188. "The commercial world has little time or
inclination to argue about valuations shown on a balance sheets and, in most instances, the
sort of evidence that is adduced upon the trial of an issue of insolvency when the debtor resists
adjudication in bankruptcy is not available." MAcLAcHLA, supra note 162, at 55.
1 Insolvency at the time of the commission of the act was required in connection with
the second and third acts and was a usual accompaniment of the first act, although a person
may make a fraudulent transfer without being insolvent. Proof of the fifth act of bankruptcy
required a showing of insolvency or inability to pay debts as they matured, i.e., insolvency
in the equity sense, at the time the act was committed. The sixth act of bankruptcy required
the debtor to admit substantially that he was insolvent in an equity sense.
The first sentence of section 3c of the Bankruptcy Act made an allegation and proof by
the bankrupt that he was solvent at the date of the filing of the petition a complete defense
to an involuntary petition grounded on the first act of bankruptcy. Curiously this was the
only provision of the Bankruptcy Act which recognized that the actual financial condition of
the debtor at the time of the filing of the petition should affect his amenability to an involun-
tary bankruptcy.
"I Commission Report I, supra note 1, at 188. Several but not all witnesses at the
legislative hearings on the Commission's and Bankruptcy Judges' bill approved the recom-
mendation to abolish acts of bankruptcy. Hearings, supra note 13, at 1546 (testimony of Lewis
W. Levit for Commercial Law League of America), 1657, 1663 (statement and testimony of
L.E. Creel I for the Dallas Bar Ass'n). But see id. at 1670, 1678 (statement and testimony
of Richard Kaufman for National Ass'n of Credit Management).
rn "A frequent practical consequence [of the operation of the law requiring proof of an
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Congress manifestly accepted' this rationale when it enacted section 303(h)
of Title 11.
6. Procedure
a. Joinder of Petitioners
Subsection (c) of section 303 authorizes joinder of a qualified petitioner
after the filing of the petition and before the case is dismissed or relief is
ordered. Such joinder would be appropriate in a case where only one or two
petitioners joined in the petition or when the claim of one of three original
petitioners is disallowed and at least three are required by section
303(b)(1). Such joinder would also be appropriate where an additional
petitioner is required to satisfy the requirement of an aggregate of $5,000
to be held by petitioning creditors under either paragraph (1) or (2) of
section 303(b). The statute does not include a procedure to enable the
original petitioner to obtain information about other creditors which would
facilitate the addition of other petitioners, but the procedure for this pur-
pose provided by Bankruptcy Rule 104(e) is consistent with the statute and
thus should remain available until superseded by a new rule dealing with
the subject matter."5 6
b. Contest of a Petition
An involuntary petition may be contested only by the debtor or, if
the debtor is a partnership, by a general partner that did not join in the
petition." 7 The service of the petition on the debtor or the nonjoining
partner, and the time within which the answer must be filed or served are
presumably governed by Rules 111 and 112 of the Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure"" until a new procedure is prescribed pursuant to the amended
rule-making statute."9
act of bankruptcy] is to postpone a liquidation until the debtor has become further involved,
so that the ceditors receive less, with no compensating benefit to the debtor." MAcLAcHLAN,
supra note 162, at 57.
"' See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549. The
Co-reporters for the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules have indicated, however, that
they regard Rule 104(e) as superseded by § 303(c) of the Code.
181 Section 303(d). Rule 112 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, providing for the filing
of responsive pleadings and motions, appears to be entirely consistent with the statute and
therefore applicable under the Code. In accordance with the recommendation of the Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws, the provision in § 136 of the Bankruptcy Act for contest by an
indenture trustee or stockholder of an involuntary petition filed under Chapter X is not
continued in the Code. COMMISSION REPORT 1I, supra note 9, at 79.
I Rule 111 authorizes service of a summons and petition anywhere in accordance with
Rule 704, and Rule 112 generally allows 20 days after the issuance of a summons for the
serving and filing of an answer to a petition. These rules remain effective under the Code.
See the note accompanying Interim Rule 1003 suggested by the Co-reporters for the Advisory
Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
19 28 U.S.C. § 2075.
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c. Jury Trial
Section 1480(b) of Title 28 of the United States Code 9 ' explicitly pro-
vides that the bankruptcy court may order the issues arising under section
303 to be tried without a jury. The abolition of the right to a jury trial in
contested proceedings on an involuntary petition, heretofore assured by
section 19 of the Bankruptcy Act,' involves no constitutional issue, since
there was no right to a jury trial in bankruptcy proceedings under the
common law of England in 1789.192 The bankruptcy court may nevertheless
appropriately empanel a jury and submit to it any issues that arise in a
contest of an involuntary petition under section 303.
7. The Interim Between the Filing of an Involuntary Petition and Entry
of an Order for Relief
Title 11 recognizes that facilitating the filing of an involuntary petition
may increase the risk of an improvident petition. The new law contains
safeguards of the right of a business debtor to continue in business pending
a determination of the issues in a contested petition. Thus, section 303(f)
provides that unless and until the court provides otherwise, and pending
the entry of an order for relief, "any business of the debtor may continue
to operate, and the debtor may continue to use, acquire, or dispose of
property as if an involuntary case concerning the debtor had not been
commenced."'93 Restrictions on the use, sale, and lease of property of the
110 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, of Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 92 Stat. 2549.
" The Commission had recommended the abolition of the right to a jury trial of issues
raised in the contest of an involuntary petition because of its belief that the statutory provi-
sion therefore had been exploited by debtors to delay adjudication. Commission Report H,
supra note 9, at 45 (citing Rochelle & King, A Proposal to Raise Bankruptcy Courts to District
Court Level, 13 U. KAN. L. REv. 391, 395-96 (1965)). The resulting delay has permitted estates
to deteriorate in value and assets to disappear. The Commission's recommendation met with
general favor. See Cook, Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973:
Reform at Last, 20 N.Y.L. FORUM 97, 119-21 (1974)
"I2 See Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1881); In re Christensen, 101 F. 243, 244
(N.D. Iowa 1900); 2 COLLIER supra note 45, at 19.02 (1974).
"I The authorization for the continuing conduct of the business of the debtor under this
provision does not, however, protect all persons who deal with the debtor during the interim.
Section 549(a) authorizes the trustee to avoid any postpetition transfer of property of the
estate, even though authorized under § 303(f), unless the transfer is saved by subsection (b)
or (c) of section 549.
Section 549(b) validates against the trustee any transfer during the interim to the extent
it is for value other than the satisfaction or security of a prepetition debt, irrespective of
knowledge by the transferee of the pendency of the case. This subsection represents a change
of the law of § 70d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act by neutralizing the effect of actual knowledge
by the transferee of the pendency of the case. The Commission had recommended similar
protection for persons dealing with the debtor during the interim before the order for relief.
COMMISSION REPORT H, supra note 9, § 4-208(c).
Section 549(c) makes unavoidable any transfer of real property during the interim to a
bona fide purchaser for a present fair equivalent value or to a purchaser at a judicial sale
without constructive knowledge of the pendency of the case. If the real property of the debtor
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estate prescribed by section 363 do not limit the debtor during the interim
before the order for relief unless a court order imposes one -or more of these
restrictions.'94 Those who extend credit or acquire claims in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business or financial affairs'95 during the interim
between the filing of an involuntary petition and the order for relief or the
appointment of a trustee"' if that occurs earlier, have claims allowable
against the estate."' These claims are accorded priority just below that
given administrative expenses.' 8
is located in the county where the case is commenced, the filing of the petition is deemed to
give all subsequent purchasers constructive knowledge of the pendency of the case; if the
property is located in another county, a copy of the petition must be filed in the records of
real estate conveyances in such county to constitute constructive knowledge to subsequent
purchasers. A purchaser of real property at a judicial sale is apparently protected by the
statute without regard to his actual knowledge of the case or the value of the consideration
given for the property, but the purchaser who gives present value is protected only to the
extent of the value given without actual knowledge of the case. These results are generally
consistent with those required by § 21g of the Bankruptcy Act. For a discussion of the law
under § 21g, see 2 COLLIER, supra note 6, at 21.30 (1974); MAcLACHLAN, supra note 162, §
197.
... Section 363 actually refers only to the trustee in restricting the use, sale, or lease of
property of the estate, but a debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case is subject to these
restrictions under section 1107. HOUSE REpoRT, supra note 17, at 404, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 6360. Moreover, § 541(a) converts the property of the debtor into property of
the estate on the commencement of a case under § 303. Although inadequately expressed,
the Congressional intent is apparently to permit the debtor to use, sell, and lease his property
before the entry of the order for relief without any constraint, direct or indirect, imposed by
§ 363. If the estate or secured creditors need protection against spoliation by the debtor or
others, section 303(f) recognizes the authority of the bankruptcy court to enter appropriate
orders. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 323, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & A. NEws at 6279;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 33, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5819. Such an
order may include the appointment of an interim trustee pursuant to subsection (g). See note
206 infra.
"I The reference to financial affairs in § 502(f) is apparently intended to protect a
creditor acquiring a claim against a debtor who is not engaged in business but who incurs
the debt in a routine or ordinary transaction. Cf. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 373, [19781
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6329; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 88, [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5874.
,' See text accompanying notes 205-07 infra.
, Section 502(f); HoUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 354, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6310; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 65, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
5851.
" Section 507(a)(2). Such a priority had been recommended by the Commission.
COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, § 4-405(a)(2). The legislative reports indicated that
"involuntary gap" creditors were granted first priority under the Bankruptcy Act. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 17, at 357, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6313; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 62, at 69, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5855. The law was far from
clear on this point. Section 63b of the Bankruptcy Act simply declared that a gap creditor
had a provable claim for property transferred or services rendered "for the benefit of the
estate" to the extent of the value received by the estate. See MAcLACHLAN, supra note 162,
§§ 140,294. This provision was held not to cover claims for taxes. In re Berkshire Hardware
Co., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 663,666 (D. Mass. 1941). The Senate Report accompanying S.2266,
supra note 62, at 69, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5855, declared, however, that
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Under section 303(e) the court may require the petitioners, after notice
and hearing for cause, to file a bond to indemnify the debtor. 9 This re-
quirement is intended to discourage frivolous and spiteful petitions.10  In-
demnification of the debtor may be required under section 303(i) if the
petition is dismissed without the consent of the petitioners and the debtor.
Under that subsection the court may grant judgment for the debtor against
the petitioners for costs, a reasonable attorney's fee, or any damages proxi-
mately caused by the installation of a trustee under Title 11.1, If the debtor
can establish "bad faith," the petitioner may also be held liable for any
damages proximately caused by the filing of the petition or for punitive
damages.1 2 As the legislative reports recognized, an involuntary petition
that is dismissed because none of the grounds specified in subsection (h)
is established may nonetheless result in putting the debtor out of busi-
ness. 23 The statute does not impose liability in such a case, however, unless
the petition was filed in bad faith or damages proximately resulted from
the displacement of the debtor from possession of its property by the ap-
pointment of a trustee.
2
1'
The new law does not provide for the appointment of a receiver, and
indeed the court is prohibited by section 108(b) from making such an
appointment. Although section 701(a) authorizes the appointment of an
interim trustee in a liquidation case only after an order for relief has been
entered,' 5 section 303(g) provides for the appointment of an interim trus-
tee before entry of an order for relief in an involuntary case if necessary to
preserve the property of the estate or to prevent loss to the estate.2 0 The
the priority granted gap creditors by § 507(a)(2) would include taxes incurred during the
conduct of the ordinary course of the debtor's business or financial affairs.
"' Section 303(e) goes further than Rules 201(d) and 10-201 and § 69a of the Bankruptcy
Act, from which it was derived. These provisions of prior law authorized the imposition of a
bond requirement only when there was an application for the appointment of a receiver in a
straight bankruptcy case.
m HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 323, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6279;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 33, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5819.
M0, The legislative intent is to permit all three kinds of awards to be made against the
petitioners in an appropriate case. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 324, [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6280; and Senate Report, supra note 62, at 34, [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5820, where § 203(i) is paraphrased. The use of "or" here is explained
by a reference to § 102(5), which provides that as used in Title 11 is "not exclusive." The
legislative reports explained as follows: "Thus, if a party 'may do (a) or (b)', then the party
may do either or both. The party is not limited to a mutually exclusive choice between the
two alternatives." HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 315, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6272; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 28, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 5813.
212 Section 303(i)(2).
2 House Report, supra note 17, at 323, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6279;
Senate Report, supra note 62, at 33, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 5819.
201 Section 303(i)(1)(C).
21 The court makes the appointment of the interim trustee under § 701(a), but in the
18 pilot districts, § 15701(a) authorizes the United States trustee to make the appointment.
2 The trustee is appointed by the United States trustee in any of the 18 pilot districts,
§ 15303, and by the court in any of the other districts. § 303(g). In both kinds of districts,
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appointment may be made only on request of a party in interest and after
notice to the debtor and a hearing.0 7 The trustee may take possession of
the property and operate any business of the debtor. As under Rule 201(d),
the debtor may regain possession on filing a bond in an amount fixed by
the court, conditioned on the debtor's accounting for and delivering to the
trustee the property of the estate or its value.
8. Conversion of a Case Under One Chapter to a Case Under Another
Chapter
The question arises whether, if an involuntary case is commenced
against an amenable debtor, the case may be interrupted by the filing of
a petition under another chapter by the debtor. This question involves a
construction of the sections dealing with conversion. Under section 706, a
debtor may convert a case under Chapter 7 to a case under Chapter 11 or
Chapter 13 at any time, unless the debtor is not eligible for relief under
however, the court determines after notice and hearing whether an interim trustee shall be
appointed.
The Code provisions relative to the appointment of an interim trustee under § 303(g) are
cryptic. The latter subsection authorizes the court to appoint an interim trustee before an
order for relief but then refers to § 701, which authorizes an appointment of an interim trustee
only "after the order for relief under this chapter." A person selected under § 701 to serve as
trustee qualifies under § 322 by filing a bond with the court. Inferably the interim trustee
appointed under § 303(g) qualifies in the same way, but the statute and legislative history
are silent about the matter. In a nonpilot district the court determines the amount of the bond
and the sufficiency of the surety on the bond. See § 322(b). In a pilot district the amount of
a bond and the sufficiency of the surety on the bond filed by a trustee under § 322(a)(2) are
determined by the United States trustee, according to § 15322(b)(1), but there is no §
322(a)(2). S.658, passed by the Senate on September 7, 1979, would delete the "(2)" from §
15322(b)(1) but would not clarify the obscurities concerning the appointment and qualifica-
tion of an interim trustee.
207 The import of "on request of a party in interest" is considered in legislative history
that discusses § 102(1), where the expression "after notice and a hearing" appears:
The phrase 'on request of a party in interest' . is intended to restrict the court
from acting sua sponte. Rules of bankruptcy procedure or court decisions will deter-
mine who is a party in interest for the particular purposes of the provisions in
question. ...
The phrase 'after notice and a hearing' . . . is intended . . . to mean after such
notice as is appropriate in the particular circumstances, and such opportunity, if
any, for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstances. If a provision
of title I [sic] authorizes an act to be taken 'after notice and a hearing' this means
that if appropriate notice is given and no party to whom such notice is sent timely
requests a hearing, then the act sought to be taken may be taken without an actual
hearing.
In very limited emergency circumstances, there will be insufficient time for a hear-
ing to be commenced before an action must be taken. The action sought to be taken
may be taken if authorized by the court at an ex parte hearing of which a record is
made in open court. A full hearing after the fact will be available in such an
instance.
Congressional Record, supra note 29, at H11090 and S1707.
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the chapter to which conversion is sought"'8 or the case had previously been
converted from one under either of those chapters. 9 A liquidation case can
also be converted on request of a creditor or other party in interest and
after notice and hearing" ' to a Chapter 11 case but not to a Chapter 13
case.2 11 Likewise a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 case may be converted on the
request of a creditor or other party in interest to a liquidation case, but
only if the debtor is subject to an involuntary petition under section 303.212
The right of a creditor to seek conversion can be exercised without regard
to whether the original petition commenced a voluntary or an involuntary
case. A single party in interest may seek conversion, even though such a
party could not have qualified as a petitioning creditor for an involuntary
case under section 303.213
D. Cases Ancillary to Foreign Proceedings-Section 304
Section 304, authorizing the commencement of a case ancillary to a
foreign proceeding, is a new provision and is derived from a recommenda-
tion of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws.2 1 1 If a case concerning a
debtor is pending in another country, a "case ancillary to the foreign pro-
ceeding" may be commenced by the filing of a petition in this country by
a foreign representative of the debtor.
215
As earlier indicated, 2 1 section 303(b) (4) authorizes a foreign representa-
tive to initiate an involuntary case against a debtor concerning whom a
foreign proceeding is pending. The option provided by section 303(b)(4)
manifestly contemplates an independent case, although a provision in sec-
tion 508(a) requires an equalization of distribution when a creditor has
2 A stockbroker or commodity broker may not convert a case under Chapter 7 to a case
under either Chapter 11 or Chapter 13, see §§ 706(a) & 109(d), and any debtor who is not an
individual with regular income and indebtedness within the limitations prescribed by § 109(e)
may not seek conversion of a case to one under Chapter 13. A spouse of an individual eligible
to convert to a case under Chapter 13 may convert only if the spouse is independently eligible
or is joining with his or her spouse who is likewise converting.
2" It appears that a case started as a Chapter 13 case and converted to a Chapter 7 case
pursuant to § 1307 on request of the debtor may not thereafter be converted under § 706 at
the behest of the debtor or any other party in interest to a Chapter 11 case. It likewise seems
that a case started under Chapter 11 cannot be converted to a liquidation case under Chapter
7 by the debtor or on request of a creditor or other party in interest pursuant to § 1112. The
legislative intent in these situations, however, is not unmistakably clear.
210 Section 706(b).
2,, Section 706(c).
2,2 Sections 1112(b) & (c) and 1307(b) & (e). A farmer or corporation protected from an
involuntary petition under § 303(a) and from an involuntary conversion of a Chapter 11 or
13 case into a case under any other chapter concerning such a debtor is not protected from
an involuntary conversion of a liquidation case into a Chapter 11 case.
2,3 The term "party in interest" is not defined. See note 207 supra.
21 COMMISSION REPORT If, supra note 9, at 69-71.
2,5 A "foreign proceeding" is defined in § 101(19), and a "foreign representative" is
defined in § 101(20). See note 156 supra.
28 See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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received a distribution in a foreign proceeding on a claim that is allowed
in a case instituted under Title 11. Section 304, however, contemplates a
proceeding that is merely ancillary to the main proceeding. The House
Report explained that such a petition "does not commence a full bank-
ruptcy case."" 7
If the petitioner proceeds under section 303,218 the debtor may file an
answer and contest the petition, whereas if the petition is filed under
section 304, any "party in interest" may controvert the petition. 29 If the
petition is filed under section 303, the petitioner must allege and, if the
petition is contested, must prove the general nonpayment of debts or that
a custodianship arose within 120 days before the filing of the petition.2 2 0
While any party in interest may controvert a petition filed under section
304, there is no requirement of a showing of nonpayment of debts or of
custodianship.
When an order for relief is entered against a foreign debtor under sec-
tion 303, the debtor is treated like any domestic debtor. This means that
the debtor's estate is collected by a trustee, claims are allowed, and the
proceeds of the estate are distributed in accordance with the rules pre-
scribed in Chapter 5. The modes of relief available under section 304(b)
include: (1) an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action against the debtor or its property, the enforcement of any judg-
ment against the debtor's property, or the creation or enforcement of a lien
against its property; (2) an order to turn over the property of the debtor's
estate or its proceeds; or (3) an order for other appropriate relief.2'
27 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 324, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 6280.
Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann raised the question whether § 304 is constitutional, suggesting
that the Tenth Amendment precludes federal intervention in the absence of a domestic
bankruptcy interest. Hearings, supra note 13, at 1447, 1450. The constitutionality of § 304
cannot be seriously doubted. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 1515-16 (statement of Professor
Stefan A. Riesenfeld); Howard, United States Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Unregulated
Foreign Banks, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 359, 388-93 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Howard].
21 The foreign representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding may file an involuntary
petition against the debtor in a domestic proceeding under § 303(b)(4). While a single creditor
may qualify as a sole petitioner under § 303(b)(2), see text accompanying note 147 supra,
generally three or more petitioners are required for an involuntary petition by creditors. One
partner may file an involuntary petition against the partnership under § 303(b)(3).
29 Section 304(b) provides that "if a party in interest does not timely controvert the
petition, or after trial," the court may take one of three kinds of action. A "party in interest"
is not defined in the Act. See note 207 supra.
22 See text accompanying notes 161-85 supra.
"' As pointed out in Stevens, supra note 158, at 64-65, § 304 would have significantly
strengthened the position of the German liquidator of the Herstatt Bank in dealing with
creditors who attached funds of the bank in the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. Query,
whether turnover ordered pursuant to § 304(b)(2) would subject the property to the laws of
the foreign jurisdiction and deprive creditors of liens obtained under the laws of this country?
The Commission assumed that its proposed § 4-103(b)(4) would not have this effect, stating
that "[tihis does not override the general American rule of conflict of laws that foreign
trustees may not defeat rights acquired by local creditors through levy on local assets.
But see Stevens, supra note 158, at 64:
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While as previously noted, section 304 contemplates that a petition
under the section may be controverted and that relief may be granted only
after trial, the section does not specify what the issues may be at trial.
Subsection (c), however, specifies six factors to guide the court in deter-
mining what relief will best assure "an economical and expeditious admin-
istration" of the debtor's estate. These considerations are: (1) just treat-
ment of all holders of claims against or interests in the estate; (2) protec-
tion of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and inconveni-
ence in a foreign proceeding; (3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent
dispositions of the property of the estate; (4) distribution of proceeds of the
estate substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by Title 11;
(5) comity; and (6) the appropriate provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start for the individual concerned in the foreign proceeding.,' The House
and Senate Reports emphasized that these guidelines are designed to give
the court the maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases.
2 3
"Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments and laws
of other nations suggest" that the court be accorded the utmost flexibility
in entering appropriate orders.24
In order to assure a foreign representative that the access to the bank-
ruptcy court afforded him under sections 303, 304, and 305 are not a trap,
section 306 provides that an appearance in the bankruptcy court under any
Attaching creditors whose liens survived the preference period under Section 547
... solely because of the delay and confusion involving the insolvent multinational
might have found their liens under attack from German preference laws applied to
implement the fundamental bankruptcy goal of preference avoidance as articulated
in Section 304 and 305.
The American conflict of law rules dealing with domestic property subject to a judicial lien
when the debtor's estate is under foreign administration are discussed in Hearings, supra note
13, at 1486-87, 1505 (statement of Professor Kurt Nadelmann); Nadelmann, Solomons v. Ross
and International Bankruptcy Law, 9 MOD. L. RE V. 154, 163-68 (1946); Riesenfeld, The Status
of Foreign Administrators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative Survey, 24 AM. J. COMP. L.
288, 306 (1976).
2 Section 304(c) paraphrases the last sentence of the Commission's proposed § 4-103(c)
but adds the factor of "comity." COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, at 69-70. The role of
comity is discussed in Stevens, supra note 158, at 70-72.
The references in § 304(c) to just treatment of holders of claims and interests, protection
of creditors in the United States from prejudice and inconvenience, and distribution accord-
ing to the priority system of the Code enable the court to apply a policy of reciprocity.
COMMISSION REPORT I, supra note 1, at 70; Stevens, supra note 158, at 72-75. The provisions
of the Commission's proposed § 4-103(c), on which § 304(c) is based, were nevertheless
criticized for failure to limit the foreign representative's rights under the Code by more
explicit incorporation of the principle of reciprocity. See Howard, supra note 217, at 385-96.
2" House REPORT, supra note 17, at 325, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 35, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5821. The
Reports disagreed with critics of the Commission's proposal from which § 304 was derived as
to whether such a provision enhances or impairs flexibility. See Hearings, supra note 13, at
1447, 1448, 1451 (statements of Professor Kurt H. Nadelmann); Howard, supra note 217, at
398-99.
"I HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 325, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 35, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5821.
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of these three sections does not submit the foreign representative to the
jurisdiction of any court of the United States for any other purpose.25 The
bankruptcy court may nevertheless condition any grant of relief under any
of these sections on compliance by the foreign representative with the
orders of the bankruptcy court.211
III. ABSTENTION
Section 305(a) empowers the court, after notice and hearing, to dismiss
a case under Title 11 or to suspend proceedings in such a case at any time
if "(1) the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by
such dismissal or suspension; or (2) (A) there is pending a foreign proceed-
ing; and (B) the factors specified in section 304(c) of this title warrant such
dismissal or suspension.2 27 The House Report accompanying H.R. 8200
22 The German liquidator of the Herstatt Bank is reported to have been advised not to
appear in the United States to attack preferences obtained in this country by creditors
through attachments of its funds in the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., because of the risk of
being subjected to the jurisdiction of American courts and adverse judgments that might be
res judicata in Germany and of being exposed to discovery procedures. Becker, International
Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt, 63 A.B.A.J. 1290, 1292 (1976). See also note 158 supra.
Although the legislative reports indicated that § 306 was needed to protect the foreign
representative from creditors who might file an involuntary petition in this country for the
purpose of inducing the representative to come to this country and thereby to subject the
estate to American jurisdiction, the statute protects the foreign representative from subject-
ing himself to jurisdiction of any state court as well as of any federal court. HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 17, at 352, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281; SENATE REPORT, supra
note 62, at 36, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5821.
12 Section 306 suggests that the relief sought by the foreign representative may be denied
unless he submits to in personam jurisdiction of the court. Stevens, supra note 158, at 69.
The size of the estate subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the domestic bankruptcy court will
of course have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of any effort to obtain the consent of the
foreign representative to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. On the other hand, submis-
sion by a foreign representative to in personam jurisdiction does not deprive the foreign court
of its jurisdiction, either in personam or in rem, in respect to the foreign representative and
the estate of the debtor.
Thus, although coordination among bankruptcy courts of the world may require an
increasing reliance on in personam jurisdiction, practically speaking, in rem juris-
diction, which provides a more ready means for enforcing orders, will continue to
be a touchstone of bankruptcy proceedings and to limit the degree of international
cooperation among courts.
Id. at 70. The legislative reports disavow any Congressional intent to give the bankruptcy
court "carte blanche ...to require the foreign representative to submit to jurisdiction in
other courts contrary to the general policy of the section." The purpose of § 306 is to enable
the bankruptcy court to enforce its own orders necessary to the grant of appropriate relief
under § 303, 304, or 305. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 326, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6282; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 36, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5822.
12 A foreign representative is explicitly authorized to seek dismissal or suspension of a
case under Title 11 if a foreign proceeding is pending. § 305(a)(2)(A). Since there can be no
foreign representative without the pendency of a foreign proceeding (§ 101(20)), subparagraph
(2)(A) is simply a statutory grant of standing to such a representative. Professor Kurt H.
Nadelmann vigorously opposed the recommendations of the Commission on Bankruptcy
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suggested that a court might properly exercise its power under section
305(a) when an out-of-court workout affords adequate assurance of a satis-
factory adjustment with less expense than full administration under Title
11.2 The provision for abstention when there is no pending proceeding
concerning the debtor in any other jurisdiction, 229 is new in the bankruptcy
statutes, though there is authority for recognizing an inherent power in the
bankruptcy court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.23 There is consider-
able overlap between the two paragraphs of section 305(a) since all the
factors specified in section 304(c), with the possible exception of "comity,"
involve the interest of creditors and the debtor. The fact that a similar
proceeding is pending should obviously influence the court when a discre-
tionary dismissal or suspension is sought, but the absence of such a com-
peting proceeding does not preclude the court from weighing many of the
same factors in acting on an abstention request.
The authority of the court to abstain under section 305 extends to a case
filed under section 301, 302, 303, or 304. While the Code speaks only of
dismissal or suspension of a case, the statutory language should not pre-
Laws to accord standing to foreign representatives. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 1448, 1449,
& 1451.
R HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 325, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281;
SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 36, [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5822.
2" The legislative reports noted that "[a] principle of the common law requires a court
with jurisdiction over a particular matter to take jurisdiction." HousE REPORT, supra note 17,
at 325, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 35,
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 582. In 1962, however, the Bankruptcy Act was
amended to authorize the bankruptcy court in its discretion to withhold or suspend the
exercise of jurisdiction of a case concerning a debtor that had been judged bankrupt in a
foreign country. Bankruptcy Act § 2a(22). See Kennedy, Bankruptcy Legislation of 1962, 4
B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 241, 246-48 (1963). The statute dictated that the court exercise its
discretion with "regard to the rights or convenience of local creditors and to all other relevant
circumstances." Bankruptcy Rule 119, promulgated in 1973, authorized the court to exercise
its discretion with "regard to the rights and convenience of local creditors and to all other
relevant circumstances," and to dismiss or suspend a case on appropriate terms when the
purpose of a foreign proceeding by or against a debtor was liquidation or rehabilitation. The
rule retained the direction to have regard for local creditors and other circumstances. The
Commission recommended the inclusion of a provision in its Bankruptcy Act of 1973 similar
to Rule 119 but omitted any reference to the rights or convenience of local creditors.
COMMISSION REPORT II, supra note 9, § 4-103(a). Section 2a(22) of the Bankruptcy Act, Rule
119, and the cases construing these provisions are discussed in Nadelmann, Rehabilitating
International Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18-21
(1977) [hereinfter cited as Nadelmann]. The legislative reports make no reference to this
background for § 305.
Section 304 supersedes Rule 119 except possibly insofar as the rule requires notice to the
petitioner or petitioners and such other persons as the court may direct. The rule has been
criticized for not specifically requiring notice to the debtor and the creditors generally. Nadel-
mann, supra, at 20.
- See, e.g., SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455-58
(1940); Zeitinger v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 244 F. 719, 772-23 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 667 (1917); cf. Nadelmann, supra note 229, at 19.
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clude the court from conditioning a dismissal or suspension.2' Thus, the
court may condition a dismissal on the commencement of a proceeding in
another country or the commencement of a case in this country under
another section of Title 11.2 Except insofar as the court may in its order
of dismissal or suspension enjoin parties within its jurisdiction from pursu-
ing other remedies, they are presumably free after dismissal or during
suspension to seek whatever nonbankruptcy relief is available respecting
the debtor and his property."' In any event, a dismissal or suspension
under section 305 is not reviewable in any manner.24
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Code incorporates most of the reforms respecting the
commencement of a case recommended by the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws. The Bankruptcy Reform Act did not, however, establish the
United States Bankruptcy Administration as recommended by the Com-
mission, or any comparable agency, to perform the many administrative
functions involved in the commencement of a case under the bankruptcy
laws. The United States trustee serving in one of the 18 pilot districts
selects an interim trustee prior to the order for relief in an involuntary case
when ordered to do so by the court, but his involvement in the early stages
of such a case is typically minimal. The legislative history accompanying
the Bankruptcy Reform Act discloses a purpose to relieve the court of
administrative responsibilities, but the implementation of the Congres-
21' See Samuels, supra note 62, at 92, arguing that § 305 should be amended to provide
that a bankruptcy court, "having found that a debtor is within the jurisdiction of the court,
may dictate the terms on which the case shall be dismissed."
212 As observed in Samuels, supra note 62, at 91 n. 182, the court may not order turnover
of property to a foreign representative as a condition to dismissal of a case under § 305(a)(1),
unless there is a foreign representative to receive the property. The court may nevertheless
suspend proceedings in a case for a time to permit the commencement of a foreign proceeding
and the appointment of a foreign representative qualified to take over the property.
Professor Samuels raises the question whether the court, after avoiding a transfer in a
case commenced under § 301, 302, or 303 may convert the case to an ancillary case under §
304, under which the court may order a turnover of property to the foreign representative. It
seems clear that jurisdiction of part of a case cannot be dismissed or suspended and part
retained and exercised under § 305. HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 325, [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6281; SENATE REPORT, supra note 62, at 35, [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5821. A court would look askance at a request to convert a case commenced under
§ 301, 302, or 303 to one under § 304 after a discharge has been obtained, property has been
exempted, or a transfer has been avoided.
The bankruptcy court is nevertheless authorized to abstain from exercising its jurisdic-
tion in a particular proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d), and its decision to abstain or not
to abstain is not reviewable in any manner.
213 See Samuels, supra note 62, at 91, suggesting doubts as to a state's jurisdiction after
dismissal by the bankruptcy court under § 305 and the possible advisability of simultaneous
actions by a creditor under bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy law when discretionary dismissal
seems a likely eventuality.
- Section 303(c).
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sional objective falls short. In nonpilot districts the administrative pro-
cesses are either relegated to performance by unsupervised personnel or
involve the bankruptcy judge in these nonjudicial activities. Even in pilot
districts the role of the United States trustee in the initial stages of a case
is vague and largely undefined.
Cases are commenced under the Bankruptcy Code in much the same
way as they were under the Bankruptcy Act. A resulting advantage of this
similarity is the minimization of the confusion and litigation that would
otherwise have resulted from the lack of new Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure to govern the opening stages of cases filed under the Code. Most of
the changes result in the simplification and expedition of the proceedings
with attendant benefits of economy of administration and reduced risk of
deterioration of the estate during the preliminary stage of the case. The
elimination of numerous differences between the rules prescribed for the
commencement of a liquidation case and those governing a reorganization
or rehabilitation case permits the use of a single, uniform rule and common
forms for a case filed under any chapter. More than form is involved,
however, in the new authorization for the filing of an involuntary petition
for reorganization. The rules and forms prescribed by the Rules of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure for commencing the various kinds of cases are easily
adaptable to such a simplified and uniform practice.
The enlargement of the exclusions of financial institutions from eligibil-
ity for and amenability to relief under the bankruptcy laws has no self-
evident justification. The recommendation of the Commission for elimi-
nating the unwarranted immunity from involuntary petitions of corpora-
tions that are not moneyed, business, or commercial was ignored. The
explicit authorization for the filing of joint petitions by spouses appears to
be a realistic approach to the problems presented by married debtors. The
legal and other problems entailed by the authorization should be amenable
to judicial resolution under the general terms of the statute.
The most significant reform in respect to the commencement of a case
is the abolition of the acts of bankruptcy together with the elimination of
the right to jury trial of the issues of the debtor's insolvency and the
commission of an act of bankruptcy. Another reform of great significance
is the number of options provided the bankruptcy court for achieving ra-
tional and fair administration of estates of debtors having assets in more
than one country. Although these reforms will affect fewer cases than will
be affected by the consolidation of the reorganization chapters, they are
important and may have a significant impact on the behavior of
financially-distressed debtors and their creditors. The impact will be
greatest in cases involving transnational debtors. The net effect of the
changes in the bankruptcy law should be favorable to sound, efficient, and
fair administration of the bankruptcy laws.
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